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I. INTRODUCTION
he continued expansion of this Annual Survey of employment law
cases in Texas generally reflects the ever increasing litigation be-
tween employers and employees over workplace disputes. Non-
subscribers to the Texas Workers' Compensation system will, however,
see a reduction in litigation involving claims of retaliation following the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Texas Mexican Railway v. Bouchet.1
Of further note, this year's Article reflects at least two interesting
changes (too early to be classified as trends) over the last year:
(a) covenants not to compete saw greater frequency of enforcement; and
(b) arbitration agreements are being both utilized with greater frequency
and, more importantly, seeing greater enforcement by the courts. While
Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc.,2 intimating the possible adoption of a private
whistle blower cause of action merits a close following, traditional em-
ployment-at-will, contract and tort theories of recovery remain relatively
stable.
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that employment for an in-
definite term may be terminated at-will and without cause, absent an
agreement to the contrary. 3 Although the Texas Legislature has enacted
statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine,4 the doctrine has
1. 41 TEX. SuP. Cr. J. 383, 1998 WL 58985 (Feb. 13, 1998). For a discussion of
Bouchet see infra notes 370-78 and accompanying text.
2. 951 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. granted); see infra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993);
Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Winters v. Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990); Hussong v. Schwan's Sales En-
terprises, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Cot6 v.
Rivera, 894 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ); Loftis v. Town of Highland
Park, 893 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ); Sebesta v. Kent Elec.
Corp., 886 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Mott v.
Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied); Far-
rington v. Sysco Food Serv., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1993, writ denied); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1993), modified and remanded on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995);
Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
4. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for
refusing to participate in an abortion); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon 1995)
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remained intact, with only one narrow public policy exception, for the last
105 years.5 In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court created the only non-statu-
tory exception to the at-will doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v.
Hauck.6 The Sabine Pilot court held that "public policy, as expressed in
the laws of [Texas] and the United States which carry criminal penalties,
requir[ed] [an] ... exception to the employment-at-will doctrine" when
an employee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally
illegal act ordered by his employer.7 Since that decision, many dis-
charged employees have unsuccessfully tried to bring their claims of
(discharge for exercising rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1997) (discharge for jury service); TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political convention);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 158.209 (Vernon 1996) (discharge due to withholding order for
child support); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 431.005, 431.006 (Vernon 1990) (discharge for
military service); id. § 554.002 (Vernon 1994) (discharge of public employee for reporting
violation of law to appropriate enforcement authority); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992) (discharge of nursing home employee for reporting abuse or
neglect of a resident); id. § 592.015 (Vernon 1992) (discharge due to mental retardation);
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (Vernon 1996) (discharge based on race, color, handicap,
religion, national origin, age, or sex); id. § 21.055 (Vernon 1996) (discharge for opposing,
reporting or testifying about violations of the Commission on Human Rights Act); id.
§ 52.041 (Vernon 1996) (discharge for refusing to make purchase from employer's store);
id. § 52.051 (Vernon 1996) (discharge for complying with a subpoena); id. § 101.052
(Vernon 1996) (discharge for membership or nonmembership in a union); id. § 451.001
(Vernon 1996) (discharge based on good faith workers' compensation claim).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge
an employee-at-will. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994)
(discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity, filing charges or giving testi-
mony); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1994) (discharge for exer-
cising rights guaranteed by the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (discharge based
on discrimination). For additional federal statutory exceptions, see Cyndi M. Benedict,
Employment and Labor law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1102 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Annual
Survey].
5. See, e.g., Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 489; McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 726; Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985). For additional state and federal cases see 1997 Annual Sur-
vey, supra note 4.
6. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court created a short-
lived second exception in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989),
rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991). The Texas
Supreme Court held that public policy favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee proves that the principal
reason for his discharge "was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying for
benefits under the employee's pension fund." Id. at 71. The United States Supreme Court,
however, held that ERISA preempted the McClendon common law cause of action. See
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990). In 1990, the Texas Supreme
Court declined an opportunity to expand the public policy exception in Sabine Pilot or to
adopt a private whistle blower exception to the at-will doctrine. See Winters, 795 S.W.2d at
723. For a complete discussion of Winters, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Em-
ployment and Labor Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331, 334-36 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Annual Survey].
7. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 734. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171
n.16 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Sabine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where
the violations of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties."'); Ebasco
Constructors, Inc. v. Rex, 923 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ de-
nied) (employee's refusal to participate in criminal conspiracy by verifying falsified docu-
ments was protected activity).
1998]
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wrongful discharge within that exception.8
In Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc.,9 Lynda Austin sued her former employer
Healthtrust, Inc. for wrongful termination. She claimed that she was
wrongfully terminated in retaliation for reporting the illegal drug use of a
coworker. The coworker whom Austin reported for illegal drug use was a
family friend of Austin's supervisor. Affirming the trial court's grant of
summary judgment against Austin, the appeals court noted the general
rule in Texas that "employment for an indefinite term may be terminated
at will and without cause," and the only exception to this rule "protects
employees from retaliatory termination for refusing to engage in illegal
activity."'10 The court found that the reporting of criminal acts that have
a "probable adverse effect on the public" does not fall within that excep-
tion." The appellate court was sympathetic to Austin's case, and a con-
curring opinion was filed expressing the view that a private whistle
blower cause of action should be created because "public policy certainly
dictates that failure to protect the employee from retaliation for reporting
the use of narcotics in the emergency room of a hospital clearly places the
public at extreme risk of harm.' 12
The Texas Supreme Court has granted Austin's petition on the single
point of error that, the court of appeals erred in affirming summary judg-
ment on the basis it was bound by precedent and therefore not author-
ized to create a new cause of action for a whistle blower claim brought by
an individual employed by a private employer when the underlying activ-
ity has a "probable adverse effect" on the public.
In McClellan v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co.,1 3 Charles McClellan sued his
employer, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company (the Ritz), for wrongful dis-
charge. McClellan alleged that the hotel's general manager had in-
structed him to file a false report with the Ritz's insurance carrier
regarding an incident of sexual assault by a hotel guest on a member of
the Ritz's housekeeping staff. McClellan wrote in his statement that he
had informed the general manager about complaints of harassing behav-
ior towards hotel staff by the guest who later committed the sexual as-
sault. The general manager denied having any such conversation with
McClellan, ordered McClellan to have his statement match that of the
hotel's, and threatened to fire him if he did not comply. When McClellan
refused to alter his statement, he was fired, allegedly for poor perform-
8. See Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (amended com-
plaint that fails to allege that plaintiff was ordered to violate laws that carried criminal
penalties does not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374,
379-80 (5th Cir. 1991) (allegation that plaintiff was instructed to violate unspecified cus-
toms regulations does not state claim under Sabine Pilot). For additional cases see 1997
Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 1105.
9. 951 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997), affd (Tex. Apr. 14, 1998) (opin-
ion not available as of publication date).
10. Id. at 79.
11. Id. at 79-80.
12. Id. at 80 (Yanez, J., concurring).
13. 961 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 11, 1997, no pet. h.).
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ance.14 The trial court granted summary judgment for the Ritz and Mc-
Clellan appealed.
After noting the general rule that an employee may not be fired solely
for refusing to perform an illegal act, the appeals court found that the
Ritz had not met its burden of proof that it had fired McClellan for at
least one legitimate reason.15 Three of the four warnings that the Ritz
put forth as evidence supporting its claim of poor performance came after
the hotel's general manager had threatened to fire McClellan, making
their motive suspect.16 The one warning that was not suspect was over
one year old and, based on McClellan's continued employment thereaf-
ter, could not have been the reason for McClellan's firing.17 The evi-
dence allowed an inference that the warnings were given to McClellan to
build a file for use in defending a lawsuit and, thus, made summary judg-
ment improper.18 Finally, while rejecting most of McClellan's arguments
that filing the false report would have constituted a crime, the court
agreed that, "if appellant had knowingly signed a false statement for the
Ritz to send by mail in order to fraudulently induce Aetna to pay [the
hotel staff's] tort claim, then appellant could have been criminally liable
for mail fraud as a principal or conspirator.' 19
A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or
is left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at-will and with-
out cause.20 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge
litigation based on the violation of a written or oral employment agree-
ment has increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed
modify the at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for
the discharge of an employee.21
1. Written Modifications of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically pro-
14. See id. at 464.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 465.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 466.
20. See Wilson v. Sysco Food Servs. of Dallas, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex.
1996); Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Schroeder, 813
S.W.2d at 489.
21. See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992), aff'd, 879 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1994); cf. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d
at 735 (court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to commit
illegal act, noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-will
employees).
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hibited the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.22
The written contract must provide in a "meaningful and special way"23
that the employer does not have the right to terminate the employment
relationship at-will.24 The necessity of a written contract arises from the
statute of frauds requirement that an agreement which is not to be per-
formed within one year from the date of the making must be in writing to
be enforceable.2 5
Where no actual employment contract exists, arguments have been
made that an employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or
salary (stated per week, month or year) may provide a basis upon which
the employee may argue that there is a written employment contract
which limits the employer's right to terminate in a "meaningful and spe-
cial way." The cases, however, are somewhat difficult to reconcile and
appear to be decided on the specific facts involved.26
A similar, but usually unsuccessful, argument for avoiding the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is the argument that an employee handbook or em-
ployment application constitutes a contractual modification of the at-will
relationship. Texas courts have generally rejected such arguments, in-
stead adhering to the general rule that employee handbooks do not con-
stitute written employment agreements, provided the handbooks:
(1) give the employer the right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the
handbook; (2) contain an express disclaimer that the handbook consti-
tutes an employment contract; or (3) do not include an express agree-
ment mandating specific procedures for discharging employees.27
Therefore, employee claims of a contractual modification of the at-will
relationship based on a handbook have generally been unsuccessful.2 8
22. See Comprehensive Care Corp. v. Bosch, 899 S.W.2d 435, 437-38 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1995, no writ); Loftis, 893 S.W.2d at 155.
23. Rios v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
24. See Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989);
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990),
affd on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991).
25. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987); Bow-
ser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Morgan v. Jack Brown
Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
26. See Rios, 930 S.W.2d at 815 (hiring based on annual salary may limit in meaningful
and special way employer's prerogative to discharge employee during stated period, but
court herein found no contract where letter communicating offer did not have commence-
ment date or clear durations, nor was employee asked to accept terms by signing of letter);
Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ., 902 S.W.2d 81, 83-84 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, writ dism'd) (salary quoted per month created one month contract at most); Wi-
nograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied)
(letter confirming employment and annual salary held to be a contract of employment).
27. See Spuler v. Pickar, 958 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1992); Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
932 F.2d 458, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1991); Washington v. Naylor Indus. Servs., Inc., 893 S.W.2d
309, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
28. See Brown v. Montgomery County Hosp. Dist., 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537, 1998 WL
107922 (Mar. 13, 1998) (employee manual did not create written contract of employment,
because the manual did not explicitly limit the relationship or restrict employer's right to
terminate the employee); Figueroa v. West, 902 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995,
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The general principle that an employee handbook does not create a
contract between employer and employee has also been applied to an
employer's unilateral modification of benefits outlined in an employee
handbook.29
In McDonald v. City of Corinth,30 Kenneth McDonald was terminated
from his position as City Administrator for the City of Corinth (the City).
After commencing his employment, the City adopted a new version of its
Personnel Policy Manual (the Manual) which stated that the City Admin-
istrator could only be terminated for cause or lack of confidence. The
Manual also set forth detailed procedures regarding grievances, termina-
tions, disciplinary actions, and appeals. McDonald claimed that the new
Manual modified his at-will status and created an employment contract
that restricted the City's ability to fire him. McDonald argued that the
detailed procedures and the "for cause" limitation, coupled with the fact
that the City followed these procedures, told McDonald that he could
rely on the Manual and treat the Manual as a contractual obligation. The
Fifth Circuit disagreed and pointed out that the Manual also provided a
means for termination other than for good cause.31 Furthermore, the
Manual stated that the "handbook is a general guide and does not consti-
tute an employment agreement or contract and does not guarantee fur-
ther employment with the City of Corinth. ' 32 Relying on Texas authority
that a disclaimer in a handbook negates any implication that a manual
restricts the at-will relationship, the Fifth Circuit found that the "Manual
did not form a contract or modify the .. .at-will relationship" and af-
firmed the trial court's award of summary judgment against McDonald's
breach of contract claim.33
In Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. R.J. Gallagher Co.,3 4
Michael Boyle had a contract of employment with R.J. Gallagher Co.
(Gallagher). The contract did not specify a position. Boyle was thereaf-
ter promoted from Vice President to President. Boyle was later diag-
nosed with cancer and demoted back to Vice President. Boyle sued
Gallagher for, among other things, breach of contract. The court held
that demoting Boyle did not violate the contract because the contract was
no writ) (employment manual will modify employment at-will relationship only if manual
specifically and expressly curtails the employer's right to terminate the employee).
29. See Gamble v. Gregg County, 932 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1996, no writ) (employee policy handbook or manual does not, by itself, constitute binding
contract unless the manual uses language clearly indicating intent to do so); Peoples v.
Dallas Baptist Univ., No. 05-95-00583-CV, 1996 WL 253340 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no
writ) (not designated for publication) (employee's claim that employer did not follow its
procedures involving vacation and sick pay set forth in policy was nothing more than re-
stated wrongful discharge claim precluded by employee's at-will status).
30. 102 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1996)
31. See id. at 156.
32. Id. at 156-57.
33. Id. at 157.
34. 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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for a term and not for a position. 35
In First USA Management, Inc. v. Esmond,36 First USA Management,
Inc. (First USA) entered into a five year employment agreement with
Dale Esmond at a salary of $80,000 per year. Esmond was entitled to
payment of the salary for the full contract term unless he was terminated
for cause as defined by the contract. The parties later amended the em-
ployment agreement to include defaulting on a loan that First USA had
made to Esmond as grounds for termination "for cause." Esmond did
not pay the note when it came due and First USA terminated him. Es-
mond sued for breach of contract. The Texas Supreme Court rejected
Esmond's argument that an employer could not condition an employ-
ment contract on the timely repayment by the employee of a debt owed
to the employer. 37 As the amendment pertaining to the loan was valid,
and as there was no dispute that Esmond defaulted on his payment of the
loan, First USA was entitled to terminate Esmond for cause. 38 Conse-
quently, as a matter of law, Esmond was not entitled to recover unpaid
salary from First USA for breach of contract. 39
In Abbott v. Pollock,40 Bill Abbott and a group of former employees of
the Burnet County Sheriff's Department (collectively Appellants) sued
Sheriff Joe Pollock and Burnet County (the County) for breach of con-
tract after Pollock failed to rehire them upon his election to office. The
trial court granted summary judgment for Pollock and the County. Not-
ing that section 85.003 of the Texas Local Government Code states that
deputy sheriffs "serve at the pleasure of the sheriff" and has been held to
apply to other sheriff's office employees, the court found the Appellants
were at-will employees and did not have a property interest in their em-
ployment. 41 The court of appeals also rejected Appellants' argument that
the Personnel Policies adopted by the Commissioners Court altered their
employment status. 42 While the Commissioners Court may have budget-
ary power over the sheriff's employees, the Commissioners Court had no
power to appoint or terminate a sheriff's office employee or dictate other
terms of their employment.43 Consequently, the Commissioners Court
could not, through the adoption of Personnel Policies, change the at-will
35. See id. at 409. The court noted that a corporation "cannot bind itself in an employ-
ment contract not to elect different officers." Id. The court also refused to find a construc-
tive discharge, based only on reassignment of Boyle back to a Vice-President position. See
id. Moreover, the court noted that "[u]nder Texas law, a director of a corporation cannot
deny knowledge of the company's actions and policies." Id. The court thus concluded that
Boyle could not be "both the author of an illegality and its victim." Id. The court also
explained that while the contract required sixty days notice of termination, Gallagher did
not breach the contract by failing to give Boyle sixty days notice prior to position reassign-
ment. See id. at 410.
36. 960 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. 1997).
37. See id. at 628.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. 946 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied).
41. Id. at 516-17.
42. See id. at 517.
43. See id.
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status of sheriff's office employees.44 Finding no employment contract
between the Appellants and the County and Pollock, Appellants re-
mained at-will employees, and the court of appeals affirmed summary
judgment.45
In Kacher v. Houston Community College System, 46 Detna Kacher was
employed as full-time instructor with the Houston Community College
System (HCCS). Kacher began a long term disability leave of absence as
a result of a liver transplant, upon her return from which she worked
part-time for HCCS beginning on June 1, 1993. Plaintiff was not thereaf-
ter reassigned to a full-time teaching position. Plaintiff claimed that she
did not learn until April of 1994 that she had actually been dismissed
from her full-time position while she was on disability leave. Kacher con-
tended that HCCS breached her contract of employment by not following
required notice procedures applicable when employees were disciplined
on the job or were terminated. HCCS countered that the policy at issue
only applied to disciplinary dismissals or non-renewals and that an alter-
native policy was applicable to Kacher's situation. Because HCCS's leave
policy did not establish what procedure HCCS must follow when it termi-
nates an employee's full-time status when on disability leave, the court
found the contract ambiguous.47 Furthermore, as HCCS did not explain
how Kacher became a part-time employee or how she validly lost her
full-time status while on leave, Kacher raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to which policy applied and, as a result, whether HCCS was re-
quired to provide her with notice of her dismissal. 48
Kacher also contended that HCCS violated another policy that pro-
vided for HCCS to "make every effort" to place a returning employee in
a vacant position for which he was qualified if his position had been filled
while on leave of absence. HCCS argued that it was not obligated to
follow this policy because Kacher failed to submit a doctor's statement on
her ability to return to work as required. Nonetheless, the court found
that Kacher had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
requirement was waived when the supervisor of Kacher's department ac-
ted on Kacher's oral statement that her doctors had released her to
work.49 As a result, HCCS's motion for summary judgment on Kacher's
breach of contract claim was denied.50
In Accubanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummonds,51 Accubanc Mortgage
Corporation (Accubanc) appealed from a jury verdict awarded Richard
44. See id. at 517.
45. See id. at 518. Appellants' attempt to argue an oral modification to their at will
status based on statements by county officials that they could not be fired except for good
cause also failed as it was undisputed that none of these officials were acting under the
authority of Sheriff Pollock. See id. at 517-18.
46. 974 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
47. See id. at 623.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 624.
50. See id. at 627.
51. 938 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied).
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Drummonds on a claim for, among others, breach of contract. Accubanc
contended that "the evidence [was] legally and factually insufficient to
establish that Drummonds' election as an officer for twelve months at a
salary of $177,100 constituted an employment agreement. ' 52 The court
of appeals pointed to Accubanc's approval of Drummonds' reelection as
president and CEO for a period of twelve months and the approval of an
annual salary of $177,000 as "some evidence to support the jury's finding
that Accubanc employed Drummonds for a twelve-month term, subject
only to removal for good cause."' 53 Despite the existence of other evi-
dence to support an at-will relationship such as corporate bylaws, corpo-
rate practice for election of officers, and conflicting testimony by
Drummond regarding the term of his agreement, the court held that
these conflicts were for the jury to resolve and that the evidence was not
so weak that the jury's verdict should be set aside and a new trial or-
dered. 54 Accubanc also attempted to rely on its written employment poli-
cies, several of which stated that employment was generally at-will.
However, Accubanc's termination of employment policy stated that, "in
the absence of a specific agreement," employment was at-will.55 As the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that there was a spe-
cific agreement stating that Drummonds would not be terminated except
for good cause, Accubanc's termination policy was not evidence of an at-
will relationship between Accubanc and Drummonds. 56 Furthermore,
the court discounted Accubanc's argument that there was no meeting of
the minds on the material issues of the contract because the parties had
agreed to a twelve-month term at $177,100. 57 No further meeting of the
minds was necessary "because, when the parties have agreed to a term of
service under these circumstances, the law presumes the employee cannot
be fired except for good cause." s58 Consequently, the court held that the
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to establish that Accubanc
agreed not to terminate Drummonds for twelve months without good
cause.
59
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when employee and
employer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral
employment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to termi-
nate an at-will employee depending upon the terms of the agreement and
the facts and circumstances surrounding the employment.
52. Id. at 141.
53. Id. at 142.
54. See id. at 141-43.
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An employee may be able to avoid the at-will rule when an employer
enters into an oral agreement that the employee will be terminated only
for good cause.60 An employee may also allege that the employer's oral
assurance of employment for a specified period of time (greater than one
year) creates an enforceable contract of employment. Normally, the em-
ployer will counter this argument by alleging that the agreement violates
the statute of frauds. The statute of frauds provides that an oral agree-
ment not to be performed within one year from the date of its making is
unenforceable. 61 The duration of the oral agreement determines whether
the statute of frauds renders the agreement invalid.62 When no period of
performance is stated in an oral employment contract, the general rule in
Texas is that the statute of frauds does not apply because the contract can
be performed within a year.63 If an oral agreement can cease upon some
contingency, other than by some fortuitous event or the death of one of
the parties, 64 the agreement may be performed within one year, and the
statute of frauds does not apply.65 Generally, the statute of frauds nulli-
fies only contracts that must last longer than one year.
66
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of
the employer's assurance.67 For example, an oral agreement for employ-
ment until normal retirement age is unenforceable because the agree-
ment must last longer than one year, unless the promisee is within one
year of normal retirement age at the time the promise is made. 68 The
courts are split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral
promise of lifetime employment. Generally, more recent cases hold that
60. See Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940); Ramos v.
Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Johnson v.
Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987);
Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1406
(S.D. Tex. 1992). Of note, oral modifications to written employment agreements are also
disfavored under Texas law. See Conway v. Saudi Arabian Oil Co., 867 F. Supp. 539, 542
(S.D. Tex. 1994).
62. See Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463 (citing Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827).
63. See id.; Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpret-
ing Texas law); Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773,
775 (Tex. 1974); Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robertson v. Pohorelsky, 583 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. See Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969,
no writ) (If, "by the terms of the oral [employment] agreement, its period is to extend
beyond a year from the date of its making, the mere possibility of its termination.., within
the year, because of death or other fortuitous event, does not render [the statute of frauds]
inapplicable.").
65. See Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. Sch. Dist., 450
S.W.2d 118, 123-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Fruth v. Gaston, 187
S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
66. See Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Mor-
gan, 764 S.W.2d at 827.
67. See Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920).
68. See Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1991);
Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the promise of lifetime employment must be in writing,69 while other
cases conclude that such a promise does not need to be in writing because
the employee could conceivably die within one year of the oral promise.70
The courts are also split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an
oral promise of continued employment for as long as the promisee per-
forms his work satisfactorily. 71 Some cases hold that such a promise must
be in writing,72 while other cases conclude that a writing is not required
because the termination of employment could occur within a year of the
oral promise.73 The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth
Circuit. Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
resolve the confusion in the near future.
In Robert J. Patterson, P.C. v. Leal,74 Norma Leal was working as a file
clerk for a Corpus Christi law firm when she began to look for another
job. Leal sent a resume to Patterson & Associates (Patterson), and Pat-
terson's office manager called her on Wednesday, inquired as to her avail-
ability to work on the following Monday, and invited Leal to an interview
on Thursday. Leal immediately resigned her current position, inter-
viewed with Patterson and, as instructed, called Patterson on Friday but
was unable to reach the office manager. Leal called again on Monday
and was informed that the job had been awarded to someone else. Leal
went to trial on a promissory estoppel type theory, with sharply conflict-
ing evidence as to whether a job offer had been made, and was awarded
damages and attorney's fees.75 In this case, "[t]he alleged offer and ac-
ceptance of employment consisted of ... purely oral representations that
were . . . nonspecific as to the duration of ... employment. '76 Under
such circumstances, when "employment is pursuant to an oral agreement
and of no definite time period, it is terminable at will by either party."'77
Furthermore, as an oral contract for employment at-will is not enforcea-
ble by either party, it made no difference whether the termination of em-
69. Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472-73 (5th Cir.); Webber v.
M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W. 2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
70. See Young v. Ward, 917 S.W.2d 506, 509-12 (Tex. App.-Waco, 1996, no writ) (oral
agreement to pay individual a stated sum per month for remainder of his life could have
been performed within one year in event of individual's death); Gilliam v. Kouchoucosr,
340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (Tex. 1960) (oral contract of employment for 10 years not excluded
from statute of frauds by provision that it would terminate upon death of employee).
71. See Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law and recognizing split of author-
ity); Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406.
72. See Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 465; Rodriguez, 716 F. Supp. at 277 (interpreting Texas law)
(oral agreement of employment so long as employee performed satisfactorily violates stat-
ute of frauds); Wal-Mart Stores v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1992, writ denied) (holding oral promise of job for "as long as I wanted it and made a good
hand" barred by statute of frauds).
73. See Montgomery County Hosp., 929 S.W.2d at 584-85; Goodyear Tire, 836 S.W.2d
at 669-70; Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1952, no writ).
74. 942 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
75. See id. at 693-94.
76. Id. at 694.
77. Id.
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ployment occurred before starting employment or after.78 Additionally,
the case relied on by Leal to establish her promissory estoppel theory,
Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Services,79 had been subsequently criticized
and was distinguishable because it involved a written contract of employ-
ment.80 Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court and rendered judgment for Patterson, finding that Leal's claim
was barred by the doctrine of employment-at-will. 81
3. Estoppel
No significant estoppel cases were decided during the Survey period.
82
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Texas law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress,83 the Texas Supreme Court84 and courts of appeals, 85 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,86 and the federal district courts87 have
consistently required plaintiffs to establish a level of conduct that is "ex-
treme and outrageous" as that term is defined in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.88 Whether conduct "is extreme and outrageous" is a
question of law for the court.89
78. See id.
79. 757 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
80. See Patterson, 942 S.W.2d at 694-95.
81. See id.
82. For -a discussion of estoppel cases decided between October 1995 and September
1996, see 1997 Annual Survey, supra note 4.
83. The Texas Supreme Court has specifically rejected the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993).
84. See Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995);
Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1993).
85. See Kelly v. Stone, 898 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied); Lee v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 897 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ); Bhalli v. Method-
ist Hosp., 896 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
86. See Atkinson v. Denton Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1996); Weller v. Citation
Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 682 (1997); Stults
v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996).
87. See Wilson, 940 F. Supp. at 1013; Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F. Supp.
596, 612 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Scott v. City of Dallas, 876 F. Supp. 852, 860 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
88. Liability for outrageous conduct exists only where the conduct has been so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Generally, the case in which outrageous conduct is found is one in which the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. d (1965).
89. See Wornick, 856 S.W.2d at 736 (Hecht, J., concurring). With a word of warning
for the future Justice Hecht wrote:
With the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court em-
barks on what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual
circumstances, meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and incli-
nation, and guided by nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the




In Steele v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc.,90 Steele sued his for-
mer employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Steele, a
manufacturing supervisor, had a history of performance problems for
which he had previously been counseled and written up. Steele was ulti-
mately terminated as a result of performance problems. Steele presented
evidence that rebutted his performance issues and gave his version of the
specific events. Nevertheless, the court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment holding that Steele failed to show the critical ele-
ment of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, that is, "con-
duct on the part of [the employer] that was so extreme so as to be beyond
all possible bounds of decency." 91
In Norris v. Housing Authority of the City of Galveston,92 Walter Nor-
ris, Jr. was terminated from his position as Executive Director of the
Housing Authority of the City of Galveston (the City) based on charges
of mismanagement, fraud, and criminal activity. The City, one of many
defendants in the case, filed a motion for summary judgment on Norris'
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the City on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim and, sua sponte, dismissed with prejudice Norris'
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all of the
defendants. 93 In so doing, the court explained that the facts as alleged
did not rise "to the level of being utterly intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety," and thus did not invoke the high standard required to maintain a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.94 The court ex-
plained that while the investigation into Norris' conduct and his eventual
termination were likely stressful and unpleasant, they were mere employ-
ment disputes that could not make a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.95 The court concluded that the defendants could not
be held liable "for merely exercising their job duties in evaluating [Nor-
ris] and terminating him."'96
In Roark v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 9 7 Candice Roark brought suit
against Kidder, Peabody & Co. (Kidder) for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress allegedly caused by a meeting in which her supervisor
shouted at her. The court held that the shouting incident was not ex-
treme or outrageous enough to rise to the tortious level.98 There was no
showing that the shouting was meant to frighten the plaintiff and, at
worst, her supervisor yelled that she was selfish.99 Moreover, the fact
that Roark ran down thirty-nine flights of stairs after the incident dis-
90. 962 F.Supp. 972 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
91. Id. at 980.
92. 962 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
93. See id. at 99.
94. Id. at 99-100.
95. See id. at 100.
96. Id.
97. 959 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
98. See id. at 388.
99. See id.
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counted any claim that her supervisor should have been extra sensitive to
her because of her heart condition. 1°° There was also no evidence that
Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. Plaintiff's crying, by itself,
was not a severe response.' 0 ' In addition, although Roark fainted shortly
after the shouting incident, the court noted that the causal link was tenu-
ous, as Roark had a history of fainting, and this episode was preceded by
a run down thirty-nine flights of stairs.' 02 Finally, any physical and emo-
tional reaction she had did not last beyond the day in question. 0 3 Conse-
quently, the court granted Kidder's motion for summary judgment as to
Roark's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 10 4
In McKey v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,10 5 Jimmy Dan McKey was
fired from his job at Occidental's Deer Park plant for violating a return to
work agreement that prohibited his use of alcohol. McKey alleged claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Occidental. The
court, however, found that the only timely event that could support an
allegation of intentional infliction was McKey's termination.'0 6 The court
held that McKey's termination did not come close to the high threshold
of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to prove a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.107 Plaintiff's complaint amounted
to a mere employment dispute and, as a matter of law, was not extreme
or outrageous. 10 8 Accordingly, the court granted Occidental's motion for
summary judgment as to McKey's claims of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 10 9
In Johnson v. Hines Nurseries, Inc.,110 Leonard Johnson was employed
by Hines Nurseries, Inc. (Hines) as a salesman. Johnson suffered a sub-
cranial hemorrhage which caused him to take disability leave from his
employment. Johnson sued Hines for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The court granted summary judgment for Hines "because the
conduct of which Johnson complains-failure to accommodate his disa-
bility, callous remarks regarding Johnson's condition to Johnson's wife,
and mocking comments about Johnson's speech problems-is not 'ex-
treme and outrageous' conduct" as was necessary to prove a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress."'
In Porterfield v. Galen Hospital Corp.,112 Anita Porterfield appealed






105. 956 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D. Tex. 1997).




110. 950 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
111. Id. at 178.
112. 948 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. ref'd).
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and her supervisor Donna Torbet (Torbet) on Porterfield's claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Porterfield alleged that Torbet was
verbally abusive towards her, prevented a lunch break, and became hos-
tile when Porterfield left work for a doctor's appointment or left work ill.
Porterfield claimed that this conduct constituted the extreme and outra-
geous behavior necessary to establish a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.113
Preliminarily, the court of appeals noted that only the most unusual of
employment cases will rise beyond an ordinary employment dispute to
the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 114 Reviewing the
record, the court found no evidence or only isolated incidents to support
Porterfield's claims.115 Further, the fact that Torbet and Porterfield may
have had difficulty communicating and that Torbet may have been a diffi-
cult or demanding supervisor amounted to nothing more than "an ex-
change of insults, indignities, annoyances, and other trivialities which, as
a matter of law, do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous con-
duct."'1 16 As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award
of summary judgment to Galen on Porterfield's claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 117
In Dalrymple v. University of Texas System, 118 Brent Dalrymple, a
faculty member and candidate for tenure at the University of Texas Sys-
tem (UT), served on a "committee in charge of conducting evaluations of
peer professors for purposes of determining eligibility for merit raises."'1 19
Because one professor did not meet the eligibility requirements for a
merit raise, Dalrymple declined to recommend the professor for a raise.
The department chair and the Dean of the Business School, however,
recommended the professor for a merit raise, despite his ineligibility.
Several years later, Dalrymple's status as a candidate for tenure was dis-
continued, in part on the recommendation of the individual that Dalrym-
ple had previously declined to recommend for a raise. Dalrymple and his
wife sued UT and several administrators for, among other things, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of administrators and the Dalrymple's appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. 120 In so do-
ing, the court reasoned that the two-year statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the date of Dalrymple's termination. 121 Because suit
was filed less than two years from the date of Mr. Dalrymple's termina-
tion, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not
113. See id. at 920.
114. See id. at 920-21.
115. See id. at 921.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. 949 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 405.
121. See id. at 403.
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barred by limitations. 122 In addition, the court reasoned that while courts
are hesitant to sustain claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the employment context, the doctrine of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is nevertheless applicable in the employment context.'
2 3
The court held that it was reasonable to conclude that retaliating against
Dalrymple for actively opposing illegal or improper activities, or for in-
forming authorities of such activities, might have been extreme and
outrageous.124
In O'Bryant v. City of Midland,2 5 officer Milton O'Bryant was work-
ing for the Midland Police Department (the Department) when he suf-
fered a back injury while performing a physical strength test. In 1992,
O'Bryant sued the Department under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. In 1993, the Department instituted a "temporary light duty policy
for injured officers" and discussed "civilianizing" some of its positions. l2 6
O'Bryant was put on light duty status and sued the Department in a class
action claiming employment discrimination, which was later dismissed by
the class. After the class action was filed, officers who participated in the
class alleged a host of retaliatory activities as a result of their participa-
tion in the first two lawsuits. The instant lawsuit followed, alleging that
the City of Midland, Chief of Police Richard Czech and Lieutenant Chief
of Police J.W. Marugg intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the
officers. The trial court granted the defendants motion for summary
judgment and the officers appealed. 127
The court of appeals stated that the dispute on the officers' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress centered on whether the con-
duct of the defendants was extreme and outrageous.'28 Although the de-
fendants gave many reasonable explanations for the actions that they
took, the officers produced some evidence that Czech and Marugg had
retaliated against them for their involvement in the lawsuits. 129 The court
declined to hold that such retaliatory conduct was not intolerable as a
matter of law. 130 Accepting the testimony of the officers as true, the
court held that reasonable minds could differ on whether the retaliatory
conduct of the defendants was extreme and outrageous.' 3 ' As a fact issue
existed, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's award of summary
judgment on the officers' claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 32
122. See id.
123. See id. at 403-04.
124. See id.
125. 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).
126. Id. at 408.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 415.






In Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Franco,133 Odilia Franco
and Patricia Mendez sued Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc.
(SBMS) for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After a jury ver-
dict in favor of Franco and Mendez, SBMS appealed. SBMS challenged
the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. First, the court of
appeals found that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
support the jury's underlying finding of retaliatory discharge for com-
plaining of sexual harassment in violation of the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act. 134 Next, the court noted that if there was extreme
and outrageous conduct in this case necessary to support a finding of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, it must have arisen in this termi-
nation.135 While there have been cases that have held that retaliatory
employment practices were not extreme and outrageous conduct, the
court of appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court had held that termi-
nation may be accompanied by the type of behavior necessary to prove
intentional infliction of emotional distress.136 The court of appeals fol-
lowed case law that a person fired for refusing to perform an act made
illegal by federal law could demonstrate that the retaliation was extreme
and outrageous found that employees who claimed that they were the
victims of retaliatory termination in violation of the Commission on
Human Rights Act might be able to demonstrate the extreme and outra-
geous conduct necessary to prove intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.137 As the claims of retaliatory termination had already been held
to be supported by the record, the court held that the evidence of the
circumstances surrounding and leading up to the termination of Franco
and Mendez was sufficient to support a finding of extreme and outra-
geous conduct. 138 However, the court of appeals went on to clarify that
they were not holding that retaliatory conduct was per se extreme and
outrageous. 139
In Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc.,140 Therese Scribner sued her former
employer, Waffle House, Inc. (Waffle House) for, among other things,
intentional infliction of emotional distress after she was terminated for
133. 951 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
134. See id. at 223.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 223-24.
137. See id. at 224.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. 976 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1997), modified, 1998 WL 47641 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
1998). In the modified opinion, the court also dismissed Waffle House's post-judgment
argument that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by
the TCHRA. Id. at *2. The court reasoned that "It]he sexual harassment suffered by
Scribner goes well beyond the sort of discrimination that the TCHRA was designed to
preempt," and that "any time a plaintiff does establish 'extreme and outrageous' behavior
required to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, that plaintiff has
necessarily established more than mere discrimination and should not be preempted by the
TCHRA." Id.
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complaining of sexual harassment. The court concluded that Ms.
Scribner did establish each of the elements necessary for a claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress but was not entitled to recover dam-
ages for the claim.141 The court reasoned that any damage award under
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress would be identi-
cal to the mental anguish award made to Ms. Scribner for her sexual har-
assment and defamation claims.142
5. Drug Testing
No significant cases addressing drug testing in the employment context
have been decided in Texas since the 1995 Texas Supreme Court decision
in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe.143
6. Defamation
Defamation under Texas law is "a defamatory statement orally commu-
nicated or published to a third person without legal excuse.' 144 A court
must make the threshold determination of whether the complained of
statement or publication 145 is capable of conveying a defamatory mean-
ing.146 In making this determination, the court construes the statement
141. See id. at 449.
142. See id. For further discussion of Scribner, including $6.3 million damages award,
see infra notes 195-208, 270-273, 498-509, and accompanying text. In its modified opinion,
the court clarified that the mental anguish damages awarded to Ms. Scribner were awarded
on the basis of her defamation claim and on the basis of the sexual harassment to which
she was subjected. While Waffle House contended that the mental anguish damages
should be limited based on damage caps associated with statutory claims, the court ex-
plained that the sexual harassment damages awarded were not only recovery for Ms.
Scribner's statutory claims, but also her tort claims. See id. at *2. Thus, the court clarified
that all damages awards attributed to "sexual harassment" in the original opinion "are
independently supported by [Waffle House's] intentional infliction of emotional distress on
Ms. Scribner, notwithstanding that [Waffle House's] behavior also violate[s] state and fed-
eral anti-discrimination statute[s]." Id.
143. 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995) (no duty of laboratory to warn either employer or
prospective employee that eating poppy seeds will cause positive drug test).
144. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law) (quoting Ramos, 711 S.W.2d at 333). Libel is defined in TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1997), as a statement:
that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, in-
tegrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and
thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
145. See Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (where the circumstantial evidence could lead
to two conclusions: (1) that the employer published the information to the employees; or,
(2) that the employees learned the information from gossip resulting from the events sur-
rounding the termination, the court held that the circumstantial evidence did not support
the jury's verdict of defamation because both conclusions were equally likely).
146. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569-70 (Tex. 1989) (citing Musser v. Smith
Protective Serv., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1987)); Eskew v. Plantation Foods, Inc.,
905 S.W.2d 461, 463-64 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ) (member of a group has no cause
of action for a defamatory statement directed toward some or less than all of the group;
when nothing singles out plaintiff, court observed that the defamation must refer to some
ascertained or ascertainable person).
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"as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances, considering how a
person of ordinary intelligence would understand the statement. '147
Only when the court determines the language is ambiguous or of doubtful
import should a jury be allowed to determine the statement's meaning
and the effect of the statement on an ordinary reader.148 The courts have
also held that a former employer's refusal to discuss with a prospective
employer the reasons or circumstances surrounding an employee's termi-
nation does not constitute defamation.1 49 Of course, if the communica-
tion is true, that is an absolute defense to the defamation claim.150
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation oc-
curs when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory state-
ment about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides
that publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to publish
defamatory statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers,
and the former employer should have foreseen that compulsion. 51 Un-
like other jurisdictions, Texas does not analyze the circumstances in terms
of whether the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defa-
mation,1 52 focusing instead on the foreseeability that the defamatory
statements would be communicated to a third party. 153 Where, however,
an employer successfully asserts the underlying statements are protected
by a qualified privilege, with insufficient evidence of malice to defeat the
privilege, at least one court has concluded that no defamation occurs, pre-
cluding the necessity of addressing the issue of compelled self-publica-
tion.154 Similarly, where the alleged statement was true, no cause of
147. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570.
148. See id.; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655.
149. See American Med. Int'l, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (former employer has no duty to talk to anyone about a
former employee).
150. See Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 640; Washington, 893 S.W.2d at 312 (communication
of results of drug test to employee's supervisor was a truthful communication, therefore, it
was not actionable).
151. See Howard J. Seigel, Self-Publication: Defamation Within the Employment Con-
text, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1994) (reviewing the rules and reasoning of various jurisdictions
that permit defamation actions supported by self-publication). Two cases in Texas have
recognized the doctrine of self-publication. See Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696
S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reason-
able to expect that contractor dismissed from project for theft would be required to repeat
reason to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reasonable to expect that former bank
employee discharged for dishonesty would be required to admit in employment interview
or in application for employment about same).
152. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little,
315 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982).
153. See Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445-46; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701.
154. See Duffy v. Leading Edge Prod., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312-14 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995). For
additional discussion of qualified privilege in self-publication cases, see cases cited infra
note 188.
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action for defamation based on compelled self-publication could be
sustained.1 55
In Accubanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummonds,156 Accubanc Mortgage
Corporation (Accubanc) claimed that the trial court erred in granting
judgment on Richard Drummonds' claim of defamation. Drummonds
claimed that the reasons listed in the letter of termination he received
from Accubanc were false and therefore defamatory. Drummonds did
not contend that Accubanc communicated these reasons to anyone, but
rather, asserted that he was required to self-publish them in order to ob-
tain new employment. The court noted that, usually, communication of
defamatory statements to a defamed party, who then in turn communi-
cates them to a third party, was not self-publication. 157 Self-publication
occurs when "the defamed person's communication of the defamatory
statements to the third person was made without an awareness of their
defamatory nature" and "the circumstances indicated that communica-
tion to a third party was likely." 158 Because the evidence showed that
Drummonds knew immediately of the defamatory nature of the termina-
tion letter, Drummonds could not prove self-publication and, conse-
quently, could not prove a case of defamation. 59 Moreover, the court
rejected Drummonds' attempt to put forth a test of self-publication, fol-
lowed by some Texas courts, that obviated the need to prove the first
element of being unaware of the defamatory nature of the statements.1 60
As a further reason for denying Drummonds' defamation claim, the court
held that there was no evidence that the reasons for discharge stated in
the termination letter were ever published.' 6 ' Accubanc gave the letter
only to Drummonds in a sealed envelope, and the contents of the letter
were not discussed at the termination meeting. Moreover, a copy of the
letter was not placed in Drummonds' personnel file, and even Accubanc's
human resources manager did not know of the letter. Also, Drummonds
admitted that he knew of no one else to whom the letter was given. The
court of appeals also noted that there was no evidence to support that
Drummonds ever published the allegedly false reasons for his termina-
tion contained in the termination letter to anyone.162 Drummonds' testi-
mony showed that the answer he gave prospective employers in response
to questions regarding his termination was what he felt was the true rea-
son for his discharge. 163 Since Drummonds only communicated to pro-
spective employers what he alleged was the truth, and there was no
evidence to suggest he communicated any of the "false" reasons con-
tained in the termination letter, there was no self-publication of defama-
155. See Rios, 930 S.W.2d at 817.
156. 938 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
157. See id. at 147.








tory statements. 164 Further, Drummonds was unsuccessful in his attempt
to assert that the fact that he was the only member of Accubanc's senior
management who was fired was in itself "enough to create the impression
that he had done something wrong."'1 65 The court of appeals declined to
hold that the very fact of firing someone constituted a defamatory state-
ment that could be published to a third party. 166 As there was no evi-
dence to support the self-publication element of Drummonds'
defamation claim, the appellate court held that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting judgment for Drummonds on this claim.167
b. Absolute Privilege
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in
the course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged. 168 No action for damages will lie for such communication
even though it is false and published with malice. 169 The privilege has
also been extended to proceedings before executive officers, boards, and
commissions exercising quasi-judicial powers170 and to governmental em-
ployees exercising discretionary functions. 171 Examples of quasi-judicial
bodies include the State Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the
Railroad Commission, the Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division
of the Police Department of Dallas, 72 and the Texas Employment
Commission. 173
A communication by an employer about a former employee may also
be absolutely privileged if the employee authorized the communica-
tion.174 When a plaintiff consents to a publication, "the defendant is ab-
solutely privileged to make it, even if it proves to be defamatory.' 75
Texas follows the general rule that if a plaintiff complains about a publi-
cation which he "consented to, authorized, invited or procured, by the
plaintiff, he cannot recover for injuries sustained as a result of the publi-
cation.' 76 In other words, the consent privilege applies when a plaintiff
gives references for a prospective employer to contact and the former
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 150.
167. See id.
168. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
169. See Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. 1942).
170. See id. at 912; Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 198.
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
171. See Brooks v. Scherler, 859 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, no writ).
172. See Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
173. See Taylor v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 303 (S.D. Tex.
1990); Hardwick, 881 S.W.2d at 198; Krenek v. Abel, 594 S.W.2d 821, 822-23 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
174. See Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
denied).
175. Id. at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977)).
176. Id. at 437 (citing Lyle v. Waddle, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1945)).
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employer makes defamatory statements. 177 While there is some uncer-
tainty whether consent creates an absolute privilege or simply makes the
defamation not actionable, the distinction is irrelevant because the result
is the same. 178
c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under cir-
cumstances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
abused.179 "Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law.' 80
"A qualified privilege comprehends communications made in good faith
on subject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to
which he has a duty to perform to another person having a corresponding
interest or duty.' 181 Generally, defamatory statements by an employer
about an employee, or former employee, to a person having a common
interest in the matter to which the communication relates, such as a pro-
spective employer, are qualifiedly privileged. 182
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or
publication is accompanied by actual malice. 183 In defamation cases, ac-
tual malice is "separate and distinct from traditional common law mal-
ice."'1 84 Actual malice does not include ill will, spite, or evil motive;
rather, it exists "when the statement is made with knowledge of its falsity
or with reckless disregard as to its truth.' 85 Further, "'[rieckless disre-
gard' is defined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for
proof of which the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication.' 1 86 An error in judgment is not sufficient to
show actual malice.187
While few Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication address
the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation ac-
tions,188 decisions in other jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of
self-publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment
177. See Smith, 827 S.W.2d at 437.
178. See id. at 437-38.
179. See Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1990); Butler v. Central
Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd).
180. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806.
181. Id.
182. See Stephens v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 924 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1996, writ denied); Wagner v. Texas A&M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1130 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
183. See Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 654; Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d
240, 242 (Tex. 1980).
184. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989).
185. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 884
S.W.2d 771, 771-72 (Tex. 1994)).
186. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513, 525-26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1996, writ denied).
187. See Hagler, 884 S.W.2d at 771.





In Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,190 Robert Burch sued his former employer
for defamation. Burch was a former management-level employee of
Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola terminated Burch for alleged performance issues.
The Monday after his termination, Burch went to Drake, Beam & Morin
(DB&M), a placement firm used by Coca Cola, where he was met by a
DB&M employee who wanted reassurances that Burch would behave
properly while in DB&M's offices. Burch testified that such questions
were a result of a facsimile received by DB&M from Coca-Cola stating
that Burch had been terminated for violent and threatening behavior.
The Fifth Circuit found such a statement to be protected by the common
interest privilege. 91 Comments about an employee by his employer,
made to a person having an interest or duty in the matter to which the
communication relates, are qualifiedly privileged. 192 Such privilege ex-
tends to statements made in good faith by a former employer to agencies
engaged in placement services. 193 There was uncontroverted evidence
that employment counseling firms utilized the reasons for an employee's
termination to aid in that employee's employment counseling. Further-
more, no evidence suggested that Coca-Cola acted with any purpose
other than to assist Burch in his search for employment.194
In Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc.,195 Therese Scribner and Resource
Recruiters, Inc. (Resource Recruiters), sued Waffle House, Inc. (Waffle
House), for, among other things, defamation. After Therese Scribner was
terminated from employment as a recruiter with Waffle House for com-
plaining of sexual harassment, she formed Resource Recruiters, a recruit-
ing company. Resource Recruiters entered into a written contract with
Grandy's under which Resource Recruiters was to be paid for each new
employee that it placed at Grandy's. In May of 1992, some two years
after Scribner's termination, a Vice-President of Waffle House contacted
the Director of Human Resources for Grandy's and advised Grandy's
that Scribner had been terminated for performance problems, was vindic-
tive, and was therefore targeting Waffle House managers to encourage
them to work for Grandy's. Grandy's investigated the accusation and de-
189. See Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D.
Minn. 1989) (recognizing that Minnesota law allows a qualified privilege in the employer/
employee relationship if the statements were made in good faith); Churchey, 759 P.2d at
1347 (recognizing qualified privilege in the employer-employee context); Elmore v. Shell
Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing existence of a qualified
privilege).
190. 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
191. See id. at 323.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 324. See also Decker v. University of Houston, 970 F.Supp. 575, 580
(S.D.Tex. 1997) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to present evidence of
malice by author of memorandum published to coworkers having an interest in the com-
munication for purposes of establishing qualified privilege).
195. 976 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1997), modified 1998 WL 47641 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
1998).
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termined that Scribner did not have discussions with any Waffle House
employees except those who initiated the contact with Scribner. Less
than two weeks later, however, another manager of Waffle House con-
tacted Grandy's, alleging that two more Waffle House managers had
moved to Grandy's as a result of Scribner's alleged vendetta against Waf-
fle House. The Waffle House manager also threatened that if Grandy's
did not stop hiring Waffle House employees, Waffle House would give a
bounty of a signing bonus for the hiring away of any Grandy's employees.
After investigating these accusations, Grandy's again determined that
Scribner had never made the initial contact with any Waffle House em-
ployee. Nevertheless, in an effort to avoid a recruiting war with Waffle
House, Grandy's reluctantly canceled its contract with Resource
Recruiters. 196
The court concluded that Scribner and Resource Recruiters were enti-
tled to recover on their defamation claim against Waffle House. 197 The
court reasoned that Waffle House had made false statements to Grandy's,
including: (1) that Scribner and Recruiting Resources were singling out
Waffle House for recruiting; (2) that Waffle House terminated Scribner
for performance problems; and (3) that Scribner was vindictive.198 Waf-
fle House's failure to contact Scribner or to conduct any investigation
with regard to whether Scribner or the Waffle House employees insti-
gated the contact indicated that the statements were made either with
malice or with a reckless disregard for their truth.199 The court also con-
cluded that Waffle House did not have a qualified privilege to make the
statements based on the alleged "potential improper methods utilized" by
Scribner and Resource Recruiters, because Waffle House failed to con-
duct an investigation which would have shown there was no raiding of
employees. 200
While the court concluded that Scribner and Resource Recruiters were
defamed by Waffle House, the court awarded no damages for lost income
or business.201 With respect to Scribner's claim, the court reasoned that
no one at Grandy's believed the statements made by Waffle House and
continued to hold Scribner in high esteem.202 With respect to the claim of
Resource Recruiters, the court reasoned that while it did sustain an eco-
nomic loss in the termination of its agreement with Grandy's, these dam-
ages were duplicative of those awarded to Resource Recruiters under its
claim for interference with contract. 20 3 The court did, however, award
Scribner $119,500 in mental anguish damages on her defamation claim.20 4
196. See id. at 487.




201. See id. at 499.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. See supra note 142 for the court's discussion of allocation of damages in a
modified opinion affirming the original award.
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In addition, the court awarded $1,149,504 in punitive damages for
Scribner's claim of defamation and for Resource Recruiters' claim of in-
tentional interference with contract. 20 5 The court reasoned that the con-
duct of Waffle House managers, in making the phone calls to Grandy's
was condoned, if not approved, by the corporate heads of Waffle
House.20 6 Furthermore, Waffle House lied about the misconduct at trial,
which was established by the notes of the Grandy's manager taken during
the telephone conversation with the Waffle House manager.20 7 The court
concluded that there was no doubt that Waffle House acted with the in-
tent of punishing Scribner for pursuing her claims of sexual harassment
and retaliation against Waffle House.208
In Abbott v. Pollock,20 9 Bill Abbott and a group of former employees
of the Burnet County Sheriff's Department (collectively Appellants) sued
Sheriff Joe Pollock and Burnet County (the County) for defamation after
Pollock failed to rehire them upon his election to office. The trial court
granted summary judgment for Pollock and the County and Appellants
appealed. Appellants Abbott, Bonnet, Whitacre, and Wall alleged that
Pollock and the County made false and libelous statements about them,
but the evidence showed that they knew of no defamatory statements
made by Pollock or any other elected County official. As they failed to
prove a defamatory statement, the court of appeals affirmed summary
judgment on their defamation claims.210 Appellant Krueger alleged that
someone at the sheriff's office told a Department of Public Safety officer
that he did not do anything all day but sit at his desk. However, Krueger
was unable to show any harm he suffered from the statement and, as
words must cause injury to be defamatory, summary judgment on Krue-
ger's defamation claims was affirmed.211 Appellant Wilie alleged that
Pollock told an unidentified person "I wonder if the voters in Williamson
County would like to know what Mr. Wilie was involved in Burnet
County. '212 The question of whether these words had defamatory mean-
ing was a question of law for the court, which found that the words were
not defamatory as they did not tend to injure Willie's reputation or ex-
pose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, cause financial injury, or
impeach his honesty, integrity or virtue. 213 Consequently, the court af-
firmed the summary judgment as to Wilie's claims.214 Appellants John-
son and Morin alleged that their termination constituted a false allegation
of misconduct. However, because a claim of defamation arises from a
statement or written communication, the court of appeals held that the
205. See id. at 510.
206. See id. at 509-10.
207. See id. at 486.
208. See id. at 509.
209. 946 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
210. See id. at 519-20.
211. See id. at 519.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 520.
214. See id.
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mere act of not rehiring Johnson and Morin did not constitute defamation
and affirmed summary judgment as to their claims.215 Appellant Pearson
based her defamation claim on a telephone conversation with a chief dep-
uty in which he told her that she almost got someone killed. As Sheriff
Pollock and the County showed the absence of publication to a third
party, summary judgment was affirmed as to Pearson's claim.216 Finally,
"appellants' affidavits stating their beliefs that Sheriff Pollock or persons
acting under his direction and control said negative things about them,
without more," were insufficient to create a fact issue on Appellants' def-
amation claims as they failed to specify any factual matters.217
In Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,218 saltwater infiltrated
a boiler system of Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
designed only for fresh water, causing millions of dollars of damage to the
power plant and resulting in the termination of several employees, includ-
ing Raymond Hardwick. Hardwick sued HL&P for, among other things,
slander, and the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of
HL&P. The court of appeals reversed the judgment as to the slander
action, and on remand, the trial court, after considering additional evi-
dence, again rendered summary judgment in favor of HL&P. Hardwick
appealed.
On appeal, Hardwick argued that the summary judgment was inappro-
priate because the doctrine of literal truth applies only in the context of
an employer's qualified privilege to investigate employee misconduct.
The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that truth is an absolute de-
fense to slander and is independent of the defense of qualified privi-
lege. 219 The court also concluded that the affidavits presented by
Hardwick concerning conversations between non-managerial employees
regarding the reasons for Hardwick's termination contained no false or
defamatory statements. 220 The statements indicated only that Hardwick
was terminated as a result of an incident involving the leakage of
saltwater into the boiler. The court concluded that although others may
have inferred that Hardwick was at fault or was incompetent, "the impli-
cations of a true statement, however unfortunate, do not vitiate an affirm-
ative defense of truth. '221 Thus, because the statements made by HL&P
were true, HL&P established an affirmative defense to slander, and sum-
mary judgment was therefore appropriate.222
In Hanssen v. Our Redeemer Lutheran Church,223 Claudia Hanssen




218. 943 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
219. See id. at 184.
220. See id. at 185.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. 938 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).
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Church), for defamation. She was a secretary at a school operated by the
Church. She was supervised by Walter Shiffer, who resigned after admit-
ting to misappropriating church funds, destroying church records, forging
signatures, and committing other criminal acts. Shiffer told the Church
that Hanssen participated in the misappropriations. An audit confirmed
Shiffer's statement and the Church asked Hannsen to resign. Thereafter
the Church published a letter to its members claiming that Hannsen mis-
appropriated funds; a letter to the school children's parents detailing al-
leged wrongdoings by Hanssen; and a report to the church members
reporting Hanssen's resignation and detailing further alleged wrongdo-
ings by Hanssen.
The effect of a qualified privilege is to justify the statement when it is
made without malice.224 The court found the Church acted without mal-
ice and in good faith and that the Church conclusively established its
qualified privilege defense.225 The communications were accurate based
on many of Hannsen's admissions and acts, such as returning money
when accused and admitting personal benefit from the misappropriation
of funds. 226 The Church reasonably believed Shiffer, and the church
members and parents had an interest in the funds and information about
the funds. 227 Accordingly, summary judgment for the Church was
affirmed.228
7. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied
contractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employer-employee relationship, Texas courts refuse to recognize
such an obligation. 229 It appears that the issue was laid to rest in McClen-
don v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 230 The court held that the special relationship
between insurers and insureds is not equally applicable to employers and
employees, and that to extend it to the employment relationship would
be tantamount to imposing such a duty on all commercial relation-
ships.2 31 Imposing the duty on the employment relationship may be an
unlawful restriction on free movement of employees in the workplace. 232
Finally, the volumes of legislation restricting an employer's right to dis-
charge an employee compels the conclusion that such a dramatic change
224. See id. at 92.




229. See SmithKline, 903 S.W.2d at 356; Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 284 n.1 (noting that
the Texas Supreme Court has declined to recognize a general duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the employer-employee relationship).
230. 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affd on remand, 807 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1991).
231. See McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819.
232. See id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987);
Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
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in policy affecting the employer-employee relationship and the employ-
ment at-will doctrine should be left to the Legislature. 233
However, in O'Bryant v. City of Midland,234 the court of appeals called
these precedents into question. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the
City breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which may arise as a
result of a special relationship between the parties. Defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that no special relationship existed between
the officers and the City of Midland and that no duty of good faith and
fair dealing can arise in an employment context. The trial court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment, and the officers appealed. 235
The court of appeals disagreed with the implied holding of the trial
court that no duty of good faith and fair dealing can ever arise in an
employment context.236 The court read Supreme Court of Texas prece-
dent as not ruling out the possibility that such a duty could arise in an
employment relationship involving the right to continued employment. 237
Because the officers may have been able to establish a right to continued
employment, the court reversed the ruling of the trial court regarding the
officers' claims of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 238
8. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Employees will often attempt to circumvent the restrictions of tradi-
tional contract damages by expanding claims to include fraud and
misrepresentation. 239
In Abbott v. Pollock,240 Bill Abbott and a group of former employees
of the Burnet County Sheriff's Department (collectively Appellants) sued
Sheriff Joe Pollock and Burnet County (the County) for negligent misrep-
resentation after Pollock failed to rehire them upon his election to office.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Pollock and the County
and Appellants appealed. The court pointed out that negligent misrepre-
sentation frequently involved a defendant's statement that a contract ex-
isted, followed by reliance by the plaintiff, with the plaintiff later
discovering that the contract was rejected or never completed. 241 In part,
Appellants based their claim of negligent misrepresentation on the
County's Personnel Policies regarding dismissals. However, as a matter
233. See McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820 (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; Molder, 665
S.W.2d at 177; Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
234. 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted). For discussion of underly-
ing facts see infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
235. See id. at 409, 416.
236. See id. at 416.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 929-30 (Tex. 1996);
Williams v. City of Midland, 932 S.W.2d 679, 684-85 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ);
Wilson v. Sysco Food Serv. of Dallas, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1003, 1014-15 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
240. 946 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
241. See id. at 518.
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
of law, sheriff's office employees terms expire when the sheriff's term ex-
pires.2 42 Accordingly, Appellants were not dismissed and could not use
the dismissal policy to establish a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.243 Appellants also attempted to rely on the oral opinions of various
county officials that the Personnel Policies prevented Pollock from not
rehiring them. However, Appellants each received a letter from Pollock
prior to the expiration of the previous sheriff's term informing them that
they were at-will employees and that they needed to submit an applica-
tion for employment in order to be considered for Pollock's administra-
tion. Furthermore, the evidence established that neither Pollock nor
anyone acting under his authority informed the Appellants that they
could only be fired for good cause and, additionally, Appellants under-
stood the statements of the county officials, on which they attempted to
rely, were only those persons' opinions and not made on behalf of Sheriff
Pollock.2 44 Finding no negligent misrepresentation, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment.245
In Beebe v. Compaq Computer Corp.,246 Bret and Luann Beebe, who
were employed by Compaq Computer Corporation (Compaq), requested
leaves of absence to attend to a troubled family business. A vice presi-
dent of Compaq told Mr. Beebe that "he would be fairly treated like
every other Compaq employee who had requested a leave of absence."2 47
This conversation led Mr. Beebe to believe that his stock options would
continue to vest during his leave of absence. Prior to the leaves of ab-
sence, however, Compaq presented the Beebes with written leave agree-
ments that stated that the vesting of stock options would be suspended
during the leave. The Beebes refused to sign the agreements. During the
Beebes' leaves of absence, Compaq sent the Beebes one final copy of the
leave agreements and advised the Beebes that if they refused to sign the
agreements, their leaves would be terminated. The Beebes again refused
to sign, their leaves were terminated, and they never returned to work.
The Beebes then sued Compaq for fraud, alleging that Compaq intention-
ally misrepresented its policy regarding the vesting of stock options. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Compaq, and the
Beebes appealed. 248
The court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment in
favor of Compaq on the Beebes' fraud claim.249 In so doing, the court
reasoned that Mr. Beebe admitted that he was not deceived by and did
not rely on any oral representations made regarding the vesting of stock
options.2 50 In the absence of any evidence of detrimental reliance, sum-
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 518-19.
245. See id. at 519.
246. 940 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
247. Id. at 305.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 306.
250. See id.
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mary judgment on the fraud claim was appropriate. 251
9. Tortious Interference
In Meza v. Service Merchandise Co.,252 Belinda Meza sued her former
employer for tortiously interfering with her contract of employment with
her new employer. Meza was a customer service clerk with Service Mer-
chandise. She applied for a position at Academy Window Coverings
(Academy), in February 1993 and was offered a position to begin the fol-
lowing Friday. She returned to Service Merchandise and gave notice to
Connie Bernal, the second in command supervisor. The store manager
told Meza that due to insufficient notice, she would not be eligible for
rehire. He also told her that if she "dogged" him in any way, he would let
Academy know that she was suspected of theft. Meza had previously
been suspected of theft, but no adverse action was taken against Meza
after an investigation. Meza complained to an employee complaint line
and was contacted by a human resources manager who assured her that
she would be eligible for rehire and that the situation would be discussed
with the store manager. The day before she was to begin work, Meza
called Academy to find out when she needed to report to work and she
was told that they didn't need her after all. Meza sued and Service Mer-
chandise moved for summary judgment asserting that there was no inter-
ference with a present or future contract. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant and Meza appealed. The appellate
court reversed and remanded, finding that sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence existed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.253 The evidence
showed that Meza called in sick on the Wednesday before her last day
and that the store manager told Meza's supervisor to tell Meza that she
better get to work or he would make some calls. In front of the store
manager, Meza told Bernal that she was told by Academy that she no
longer had a job. Bernal later asked the store manager if he had told
Academy anything about Meza. The store manager replied that he had
not, but that he had "to go and talk to [his] father. '254 The store manager
was then gone about an hour-and-a-half. The court found this evidence
susceptible to the inference that the store manager, because he was upset
with Meza's actions during her last several days, called Academy and told
them he thought Meza was a thief, or he had his father do so. 255
In Abbott v. Pollock,256 Bill Abbott and a group of former employees
of the Burnet County Sheriff's Department (collectively Appellants) sued
Sheriff Joe Pollock and Burnet County (the County) for tortiously inter-
fering with their future or potential employment contracts with other em-
ployers by stating they were bad employees after Pollock failed to rehire
251. See id.
252. 951 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied).
253. See id. at 153.
254. Id. at 152.
255. See id.
256. 946 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
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them upon his election to office. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for Pollock and the County and Appellants appealed. The court of
appeals noted that a large group of the Appellants had no knowledge of
the County, Pollock, or anyone else interfering with their future employ-
ment.257 Appellant Abbott believed that the County and Pollock inter-
fered with his ability to obtain a job because it had been difficult for him
to obtain employment, but he had nothing to support his belief.258 Ap-
pellant Bonnet alleged that a sticker had been placed on the outside of
his application with another sheriff's department stating that a Burnet
County sheriff's office employee had been evasive to questions concern-
ing Bonnet. However, he did not know of any negative statements made
about him by Pollock or anyone in his office. Appellant Krueger alleged
that the only interference he suffered was not being rehired by Pollock.
The court of appeals held that the summary judgment evidence estab-
lished that the County and Pollock did not tortiously interfere with Ap-
pellants' ability to obtain a job and, as a result, summary judgment for the
County and Pollock was affirmed. 259
In Dalrymple v. The University of Texas System, 260 the status of Brent
Dalrymple, a faculty member at the University of Texas System (UT), as
a candidate for tenure was discontinued. Among other claims, Dalrym-
ple sued several UT administrators for tortious interference with his con-
tract with UT. The trial court granted the administrators' motion for
summary judgment, and Dalrymple appealed. The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's judgment.26' In so doing, the court explained that
ordinarily, "the doctrine of tortious interference applies only to interfer-
ence committed by a third party, or stranger, to the contract. ' 262 How-
ever, when a defendant is both an agent of a party to the contract and the
person accused of tortious interference, a plaintiff may assert the cause of
action by additionally proving that "the defendant acted so contrary to
the principal's interests that his actions could only have been motivated
by personal interests. ' 263 Because Dalrymple produced no proof that the
administrators would profit personally from his absence, the court held
that the administrators were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Dalrymple's claim for tortious interference with business relationships. 264
In O'Bryant v. City of Midland,265 officers of the Midland Police De-
partment (the Department) alleged that their employment contracts with
the City of Midland (the City) were tortiously interfered with by Chief of
257. See id. at 521.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. 949 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).




265. 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 234-38 and infra text accompanying notes 330-36 for discussion of additional
causes of action.
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Police Richard Czech and Lieutenant Chief of Police J.W. Marugg. The
trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and
the officers appealed. On appeal, the City alleged that Czech and
Marugg could not be liable for tortious interference as a matter of law
because they were agents of the entity with which the officers had an
employment contract. However, the court of appeals noted that when a
defendant serves as an agent of a party to the contract and is also the
person accused of tortious interference, "a plaintiff may assert the cause
of action by additionally proving the defendant acted so contrary to the
principal's interests that his actions could only have been motivated by
personal interests. '2 66 The City made a prima facie showing that Czech
and Marugg had acted in the City's best interests, specifically through
averments of the two that they had taken their actions to save the City
money and to operate more efficiently. 267 Although the officers pro-
duced some evidence that Czech and Marugg had acted in bad faith by
discriminating against the officers because of their disabilities and the fil-
ing of the lawsuits, the officers produced no evidence that Czech and
Marugg would profit personally from their actions or that their actions
harmed the City.268 Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's award of summary judgment because the officers had not raised a
fact issue as to whether Czech and Marugg acted in their personal inter-
ests and contrary to the City's interests.
26 9
In Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc.,270 Resource Recruiters, Inc. (Re-
source Recruiters), whose contract with Grandy's was terminated, sued
Waffle House, Inc. (Waffle House) for, among other things, intentional
interference with contract. Concluding that Waffle House had intention-
ally interfered with Resource Recruiters' contract with Grandy's, the
court reasoned that there was a written contract between Resource
Recruiters and Grandy's which, although terminable at-will, certainly
would have continued for some time.271 The court further explained that
the evidence showed that Waffle House intentionally, willfully, and mali-
ciously caused the termination of that contract by: (1) lying about the
reasons for Scribner's termination; (2) lying about the singling out of
Waffle House for recruiting efforts; and (3) threatening to raid Grandy's
by "setting a bounty" for the hiring of its employees. 272 Upon a determi-
nation that Grandy's would not have terminated its contract with Re-
source Recruiters but for the conduct of Waffle House, the court awarded
Resource Recruiters $24,188 in actual damages. 273




270. 976 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1997), modified, 1998 WL 47641 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
1998). See supra text accompanying notes 195-208 for discussion of underlying facts and
additional causes of action.
271. See id. at 496-97.




10. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision of Employees
In limited circumstances courts have imposed liability on employers
who knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence that an individual hired created an unreasonable risk of harm to
others.274 Conversely, evidence of training programs, grievance proce-
dures, and positive prior experiences have contributed to favorable em-
ployer verdicts.275 At least one court has declined to recognize "an
employer's duty to provide knowledgeable and competent managers as a
viable common law cause of action in Texas. ' 276 Finally, claims of negli-
gent hiring, supervision, and retention may also be subject to a defense of
workers' compensation preemption.277
In Abdel-Fattah v. PepsiCo, Inc.,278 Salameh Abdel-Fattah (Plaintiff),
was the employee of Taco Bell, Corp. (Taco Bell), a wholly owned subsid-
iary of PepsiCo, Inc. (PepsiCo). While working at Taco Bell, Plaintiff was
assaulted by a fellow Taco Bell employee. Plaintiff sued PepsiCo alleging
negligence based on PepsiCo's failure to exercise reasonable supervision
over its subsidiary in hiring, supervising, and retaining employees who
present an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The trial court granted
PepsiCo's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 279 In so
doing, the court reasoned that PepsiCo did not owe a legal duty to Plain-
tiff. The court explained that Plaintiff did not allege any legally recog-
nized basis for piercing the corporate veil to hold the parent company
liable for the negligence of its wholly owned subsidiary.280 Moreover,
there was no fact question raised as to whether PepsiCo had abused the
corporate fiction in a way that would justify treating the parent and the
subsidiary as one entity.2 81 The court also explained that PepsiCo had no
duty to supervise Taco Bell's day-to-day management of Taco Bell em-
ployees, and thus concluded that PepsiCo could not be liable for failing to
exercise reasonable supervision over Taco Bell.282 Furthermore, while
PepsiCo did hire the President and CEO of Taco Bell, this affirmative
undertaking did not "justify extending a legal duty on the part of PepsiCo
274. See Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778, 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1996, writ denied) (employer's failure to inquire into security guard applicant's prior work
history as police officer created fact issue preventing summary judgment); Deerings West
Nursing Ctr. v. Scott, 787 S.W.2d 494, 496-97 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1990, writ denied) (em-
ployer breached duty by hiring an unlicensed nurse, who later assaulted a visitor to the
nursing home, when background check would have revealed 56 prior convictions).
275. See Mackey v. U.P. Enters., Inc., 935 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ);
Yaeger v. Drillers, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
276. Bonenberger v. Continental Ins. Co., No. 05-95-01055-CV, 1996 WL 429299, at *7
(Tex. App.-Dallas July 29, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication).
277. See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 326-28 for a discussion of this case.
278. 948 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
279. See id. at 383.
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to oversee the daily management of the employees in each and every
Taco Bell restaurant in the country. ' 283 In reaching its conclusion the
court noted that there was no evidence that PepsiCo engaged in an un-
dertaking that directly promoted the interests of the subsidiary in provid-
ing a safe workplace, nor any proof that PepsiCo had any control over the
specific individual who caused Plaintiff's injuries.284 Similarly, there was
"no proof that PepsiCo undertook a responsibility for ensuring the safety
of each individual employee of Taco Bell by directly supervising them,
hiring management personnel, implementing policies and procedures for
hiring and management, or conducting general safety inspections at Taco
Bell restaurants. '285
In Guidry v. National Freight, Inc.,286 Tristina Guidry appealed the
award of summary judgment granted National Freight, Inc. (National), on
her claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Guidry was as-
saulted and raped by an employee of National, Alberto Jaramillo, who
stopped his truck, wandered into an adjoining neighborhood, and at-
tacked Guidry. Jaramillo wore no clothing indicative of a National em-
ployee, was not in the course of delivering anything to her or to the
complex where she was assaulted, and the truck was not used in the at-
tack. The linchpin of Guidry's complaint was that National had not veri-
fied Jaramillo's statement on his application that he had no criminal
record, and if they had, they would have discovered an extensive history
of sexual misconduct in his military, employment, and criminal records. 287
National checked Jaramillo's driving record but did not contact his last
employer.
While recognizing that National had a duty to the driving public to de-
termine if Jaramillo was qualified to drive one of its trucks, the court of
appeals pointed out that this duty was not an issue in this case.288 Re-
quiring National to perform criminal background checks on job appli-
cants, as well as periodic checks of current employees, would be an
extension of the duty imposed by federal regulations. 289 Furthermore,
this case was distinguishable from a line of cases imposing liability for
placing potentially harmful employees in a position to commit torts be-
cause this case lacked an entity placing a tortfeasor in a special relation-
ship of trust with a vulnerable group.290 Additionally, this case was
distinguishable from those cases requiring an employer to check the
backgrounds of potential employees because, for liability to be imposed,
there must be sufficient evidence to show that a defendant either knew or
should have known of a foreseeable harm.291 While Guidry argued that a
283. Id. at 385.
284. See id. at 385-86.
285. Id. at 386.
286. 944 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
287. See id. at 808.
288. See id. at 809.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 810.
291. See id. at 811.
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background check would have revealed Jaramillo's record, making her
injury foreseeable, the court pointed out that, as a truck driver, Jaramillo
should never have come into contact with Guidry in the exercise of his
duties as a National employee.292 As a result, the sexual assault was not
foreseeable by National. 293 In addition, the court pointed out other fac-
tors that weighed against a finding of a duty on the part of National, such
as the social utility of National's lawful business and the significant ad-
ministrative burden that imposing a background check requirement
would create.294 According to the court, imposing a duty in this instance
would require National and other employers to be the insurer of the
safety of people with whom their employees came in contact, a duty that
the court was not willing to impose.295 National's duty was to hire com-
petent drivers, and its obligation with respect to hiring, supervising, and
retaining those drivers did not create a duty to protect someone in Gui-
dry's position from sexual assault.296 As National owed Guidry no duty,
the court affirmed summary judgment for National on Guidry's claims of
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.297
In Whitney Crowne Corp. v. George Distributors, Inc.,298 a wife, indi-
vidually and on behalf of her children, sought damages from her hus-
band's employer for negligently furnishing alcoholic beverages to him
when he was obviously intoxicated to the point of presenting a clear dan-
ger to himself and others. The husband, Jackson Deal, was employed as a
salesman by George Distributors, Inc. (GDI), the local Miller Brewing
Company distributor in Amarillo. In connection with a sales incentive
program, GDI held an awards banquet at which beer was provided by the
company. After the awards banquet, Deal attended a Miller Beer pro-
motion at the Midnight Rodeo nightclub. On the way home from the
nightclub, Deal failed to negotiate a turn in his pickup and was killed in
the resulting accident. There was conflicting testimony as to whether: (1)
GDI employees were required to attend promotions such as the one at
Midnight Rodeo; (2) the amount of alcohol Deal drank that night at the
reception and nightclub; (3) whether drinks provided Deal at Midnight
Rodeo were bought by GDI or an employee in his individual capacity; (4)
whether Deal appeared to be intoxicated; and (5) whether Deal attended
the promotion as an employee of GDI.299 The plaintiffs asserted that
GDI employees understood that they were to drink a lot of alcohol in
order to advance. Undisputed testimony established that, although GDI
passed along Miller Brewing programs dealing with drinking and driving,





296. See id. at 811-12.
297. See id. at 812.
298. 950 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
299. See id. at 87.
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the effects of alcohol on others. Nonetheless, summary judgment was
granted in favor of GDI on all claims.3°°
The appellate court stated that the lawsuit hinged on whether GDI
owed a duty to Deal.30 1 Generally, a person is under no obligation to
control the conduct of another, even if they have the ability to exercise
such control.302 However, the court pointed out that Otis Engineering
Corp. v. Clark303 established that a duty may arise when an employer
exercises control over an intoxicated employee. Furthermore, while the
duty was originally cast as that of preventing an unreasonable risk of
harm to other drivers, the plaintiffs argued that the court of appeals in
Spruiell v. Schlumberger304 extended the duty to cover the risk of harm to
the individual employee. The court found that the summary judgment
evidence in this case did not establish employment obligations similar
enough to Spruiell, in which an employee had been ordered to leave the
premises when intoxicated, to create the type of special relationship nec-
essary to impose a duty to control the conduct of Deal.30 5 The court also
distinguished this case from Otis, noting that this was not an instance
where the employer had negligently exercised control over the
employee. 30 6
The plaintiffs also asserted that GDI was not merely a social host and
therefore owed a duty as a provider of alcohol under section 2.01 of the
Alcoholic Beverage Code (the Dram Shop Act) not to provide alcohol to
the obviously intoxicated Jackson Deal. The plaintiffs argued that the
awards banquet was payment for the hard work of GDI's employees and,
when viewed in that light, was a commercial transaction and is therefore
included in the Dram Shop Act as "providing an alcoholic beverage. ' '30 7
The court found that the banquet was a social event, gratuitously given to
the participants, and that there was nothing in the record to indicate that
any money consideration was paid for the event. 30 8 Therefore, GDI's po-
sition "was analogous to that of a social host. '30 9 Furthermore, as the
record did not show that GDI ever exercised any control in requiring
Deal to leave the banquet nor that Deal was obviously intoxicated when
he left the dinner, the evidence was not sufficient to show an exception to
the rule that GDI had no duty to control the actions of Deal.310
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that GDI was acting in a joint enterprise
with Midnight Rodeo through the Miller promotion at the club, thereby
creating liability under the Alcoholic Beverage Code. The court noted
300. See id. at 84.
301. See id. at 88.
302. See id.
303. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
304. 809 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
305. See Whitney, 950 S.W.2d at 89.
306. See id. at 89.
307. Id. at 90.





that the plaintiffs were "attempting to show an exception to the rule that
wholesale distributors generally have neither the right to control the
amount of alcohol served to a retail customer, nor the duty to do sO. ''311
The plaintiffs asserted that because GDI's sales manager ran a tab at the
club and controlled who would drink on it, there was evidence that the
individuals who purchased on the tab were under the control of GDI and
its employees. As a result of the tab situation, they argued, GDI had as
much voice in the sale of alcohol as Midnight Rodeo.312 The court re-
jected this contention and noted that if GDI authorized the tab and paid
for the drinks, this fact alone would not be sufficient evidence to prove
that GDI had an equal right to control activities such as who should be
served, how much they should be served, and who should be granted ad-
mission to the club. 313 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to establish a joint enter-
prise.314 Along the same lines, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims
that GDI had engaged in a civil conspiracy, finding no evidence that GDI
and Midnight Rodeo entered into a joint enterprise or combination to
serve alcohol to intoxicated persons. 315
In Campbell v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.,316 Larry Camp-
bell sued for injuries he sustained while employed by Dan Dunahoo
(Dunahoo), a subcontractor working for Metal Systems, Inc. (Metal),
which in turn was a subcontractor of AHS Services, Inc. (AHS). As part
of the lawsuit, Campbell sued for negligent hiring, alleging that AHS was
negligent in hiring Metal as a subcontractor because it knew or should
have known that Metal was negligent in the past and had violated numer-
ous safety standards on previous and existing job sites. The court granted
summary judgment against Campbell on the negligent hiring claim, and
Campbell appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.317 In so doing, the court reasoned that Campbell failed to
establish that the alleged negligent hiring of Metal by AHS was the proxi-
mate cause of Campbell's injury. 318 The court explained that when AHS
subcontracted with Metal, it was not reasonably foreseeable that Metal
would in turn subcontract with Dunahoo, or that Dunahoo would some-
day hire Campbell, or that Campbell would alter his own scaffold into an
unstable condition, then climb onto it and fall.319
In Robertson v. Church of God, International,320 Suerae Robertson
sued the Church of God for negligent hiring and retention. Robertson
was a massage therapist. Garner Ted Armstrong was a minister of the
311. Id.




316. 946 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, n.w.h.).
317. See id. at 627.
318. See id. at 626.
319. See id.
320. No. 12-96-00083, 1997 WL 555626 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 29, 1997, pet. denied)
(not designated for publication).
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Church who frequented Robertson's massage parlor. On July 4, 1995,
Armstrong became aggressive during a therapy session by grabbing Rob-
ertson's genitals and breasts and by placing Robertson's hands on his gen-
itals. He later apologized and Robertson agreed to continue the therapy
sessions. On July 15, 1995, Armstrong again became aggressive during a
session. Robertson then sued Armstrong and the Church. The trial court
granted the Church's motion for summary judgment and the appellate
court affirmed. 321 The basis for liability under the theory of negligent
hiring is the employer's own negligence in hiring an incompetent em-
ployee whom the employer knows, or by the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, was incompetent or unfit. 322 Furthermore, there
must be some connection between the plaintiff's injury and the fact of
employment. 323 Robertson's contact with Armstrong was personal in na-
ture and not made on behalf of the Church.324 The court noted that the
Church is not an insurer of every person who comes in contact with Arm-
strong just because he is an employee. 325
In Ward v. Bechtel Corp.,326 Diana Ward, an employee of Bechtel Cor-
poration (Bechtel), supervised an employee who was openly hostile to
her. After the employee threatened Ward on several occasions, Bechtel
reassigned the employee to a different project and building. Neverthe-
less, the employee persisted in threatening to "get" Ward. Concerned for
her safety, Ward resigned her position. Ward then sued Bechtel alleging,
among other things, negligence. The trial court granted Bechtel's motion
for summary judgment, and Ward appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's decision, holding that Ward's negligence claims were pre-
empted by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.327 The court reasoned
that Ward's claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention and
premises liability were based on Ward's workplace supervision of the em-
ployee, and were not akin to claims involving off-duty altercations be-
tween two employees of the same company, and were thus preempted by
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. 328
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Commentators have urged employees to pursue claims for violations of
their state constitutional rights when they sue their employers. These
claims have by and large been unsuccessful. 329
321. See id. at *1.
322. See id. at *3.
323. See id. at *5.
324. See id.
325. See id. at *7.
326. 102 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997).
327. See id. at 204.
328. See id.
329. See City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 474 (Tex. 1996) (Texas Constitution
did not provide a right of privacy for a police officer denied a promotion because of an
affair with wife of another officer); Favero v. Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp.
1281, 1296 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (no implied private right of action for damages for violation of
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In O'Bryant v. City of Midland,330 officer Milton O'Bryant was work-
ing for the Midland Police Department (the Department) when he suf-
fered a back injury while performing a physical strength test. In 1992,
O'Bryant sued the Department under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. In 1993, the Department instituted a temporary light duty policy for
injured officers and discussed "civilianizing" some of its positions.
O'Bryant was put on light duty status and sued the Department in a class
action claiming employment discrimination, which was later dismissed by
the class. After the class action was filed, officers who participated in the
class alleged a host of retaliatory activities as a result of their participa-
tion in the first two lawsuits. The instant lawsuit followed, alleging viola-
tions of the officers' rights to substantive and procedural due process and
to free speech under the Texas Constitution. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the officers appealed. 331
The officers sought back pay and reinstatement for the alleged viola-
tions of their constitutional rights. Central to the resolution of this issue
was the case of City of Beaumont v. Bouillion,332 which held that the
Texas Constitution does not create a private right of action for money
damages but did not preclude actions seeking equitable relief for viola-
tions of constitutional rights. Although the court of appeals agreed with
the officers that Bouillion did not explicitly decide the question of
whether constitutional violations may be remedied by an equitable award
of money, the Bouillion court repeatedly distinguished money damages
from equitable relief.333 Furthermore, the historical distinction was that
an action for money damages was an action at law, not at equity.334 Con-
sequently, the court held that, until the Texas Supreme Court instructed
otherwise, they would follow the suggestion in Bouillion that the constitu-
tion does not authorize suits for monetary relief, thereby affirming the
trial court's denial of the officer's claims for back pay.335 However, rein-
statement was an equitable remedy per se, and thus the court of appeals
reversed the ruling of the trial court that the officers could not seek rein-
statement for constitutional violations.336
In Accubanc Mortgage Corp. v. Drummonds,337 the court held that
Richard Drummonds was not entitled to sue Accubanc Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Accubanc) for alleged violations of his state constitutional rights.
The Texas Constitution does not imply a right of action for damages simi-
Texas Constitution); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 147-49 (Tex. 1995) (no
implied private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free assembly
sections of the Texas Constitution, and that suits for equitable remedies for violation of
constitutional rights are not prohibited, while suits for money damages are barred).
330. 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).
331. See id. at 409.
332. 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1995).
333. See O'Bryant, 949 S.W.2d at 414.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 414-15.
337. 938 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
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lar to a Bivens action under the United States Constitution, nor does
Texas law have a corollary to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.338 "In addition, Texas
does not recognize a common law cause of action for damages for alleged
violation of state constitutional rights. '339 As a result, the court of ap-
peals held that the trial court had erred in submitting jury instructions on
this issue.340
In Pehnke v. City of Galveston,341 Lee Pehnke complained of his dis-
missal from his position as a garage superintendent with the City of Gal-
veston (the City). Pehnke brought suit alleging unlawful termination in
violation of the Texas Constitution. However, Pehnke failed to allege
what provision of the constitution the City violated. Moreover, the court
noted that Texas had not recognized as actionable violations of the Texas
Constitution. 342 Consequently, Pehnke's claim alleging violations of the
Texas Constitution was dismissed with prejudice.343
C. STATUTORY CLAIMS
1. Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of sections 451.001-.003 to the Texas Labor
Code344 is to "protect persons who are entitled to benefits under the
Worker's Compensation Law and to prevent them from being discharged
by reason of taking steps to collect such benefits. ' 345 This protection,
however, applies only to an employee of a subscriber to the Texas work-
ers' compensation system as employees of non-subscribers are excluded
from coverage. 346
The Texas Supreme Court has established a "but for" standard of cau-
sation in workers' compensation retaliation cases by analogy to the Texas
Whistleblower Act.347 In workers' compensation retaliation cases a
plaintiff must prove that the alleged discrimination occurred "because of"
the protected activity.348 "Causation may be established either by direct
or by circumstantial evidence and by the reasonable inferences drawn
338. See id. at 146.
339. Id.
340. See id.
341. 977 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
342. See id. at 832.
343. See id.
344. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996) (formerly TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1993) (repealed 1993)).
345. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
346. See Texas Mexican Ry. v. Bouchet, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 383, 1998 WL 58985 (Feb.
13, 1998). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 361-69.
347. See Continental Coffee Prods. v. Cazares, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996). See
also 1997 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at n.350.
348. See Continental Coffee, 937 S.W.2d at 450. In Continental Coffee, the Court specif-
ically recognized the proper jury instruction to be given for workers' compensation dis-
crimination cases should follow that utilized in Whistle Blower Act cases: "An employer
does not discriminate against an employee for reporting a violation of law, in good faith, to
an appropriate law enforcement authority, unless the employer's action would not have
occurred when it did had the report not been made." Id.
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from such evidence. '349 Once the link is established, "the employer must
rebut the alleged discrimination by showing there was a legitimate reason
behind the discharge." 350
The Code provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
damages and is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position.351
The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "reasonable dam-
ages" to embrace both actual and exemplary damages.352 However, be-
cause workers' compensation discrimination is a statutory exception to
at-will employment it, must be strictly construed; thus, a plaintiff who
proves a statutory violation must also prove actual malice, rather than
implied malice, in order to recover punitive damages.353 "By requiring
evidence of ill-will, spite, or a specific intent to cause injury to the em-
ployee, courts will ensure that only egregious violations of the statute will
be subject to punitive awards. '354 Employees seeking reinstatement on
the ground that they were wrongfully discharged must show that they are
presently able to perform the duties of the job that they had before the
injury. 355 In addition, governmental immunity for political subdivisions
for wrongful discharge is waived, but only for the limited relief of rein-
statement and backpay.356 Finally, a workers' compensation retaliation
claim accrues when an employee receives unequivocal notice of termina-
tion, or when a reasonable person should have known of the
termination. 357
The federal courts continue to follow Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc.358
in finding that the retaliatory discharge provision is a civil action arising
under the workers' compensation laws of Texas and, therefore, not re-
movable to federal court pursuant to federal law.359 However, such a
claim may nevertheless be removed if it is pendent to a federal question
349. Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes, 821 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
350. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
351. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996).
352. See Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1987).
353. See Continental Coffee, 937 S.W.2d at 453.
354. Id. at 454.
355. See Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
356. See City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 297 (Tex. 1995); Kuhl v. City of
Garland, 910 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the 1989 version of the Political
Subdivisions Law waives governmental immunity for retaliatory discharge and authorizes
reinstatement and backpay as well as recovery for actual damages, subject to the restric-
tions of the Texas Tort Claims Act).
357. See Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. 1996).
See also Davila v. Lockwood, 933 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no
writ) (in constructive discharge claim, date employee gave notice of intent to resign com-
menced limitations period).
358. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991). See also Phillip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Em-
ployment and Labor Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1765-66 (1992) (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Roadway Express).
359. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1994); Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1092; Almanza v.
Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Keyser v. Kroger Co.,
800 F. Supp. 476, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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claim. 360 In Texas Mexican Railway v. Bouchet,361 Lawrence Bouchet
(Bouchet) sued his employer Texas Mexican Railway (Railway) under
the Federal Employers Liability Act3 62 for personal injuries sustained in
the course and scope of his employment. Bouchet subsequently amended
his claims against Railway to include wrongful denial of benefits and dis-
charge in violation of the anti-retaliation protections of article 8307c.
363
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Railway argued Bouchet was not
entitled to workers' compensation benefits and, therefore, could not re-
cover under article 8307c. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing the ap-
pellate court and rendering a take nothing judgment to bouchet on his
article 8307c claim.3
64
Deciding that nonsubscribers to the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act 365 cannot be sued for acts of discrimination that violate article 8307c
or its recodified successor, section 451.001,366 the Supreme Court relied
heavily on both the Act's legislative history and the plain language of
article 8307c. 367 The stated purpose of article 8307c was to protect "per-
sons who file a claim or hire an attorney or aid in filing a claim or testify
at hearings concerning a claim under the Texas Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act."'368 Alleged retaliation by a nonsubscribing employer against
an employee "is not actionable under article 8307c" or section 451.001.369
In Trico Technologies Corp. v. Montiel,370 the administrator of Juan
Montiel's estate brought an action against Trico, alleging Trico discharged
Montiel for filing a workers' compensation claim. Montiel suffered an
on-the-job injury on April 27, 1990, and was fired on September 5, 1991.
He died in May 1993, and the administrator of his estate filed suit for
wrongful discharge. During pre-trial discovery, Trico learned that Mon-
tiel lied on a physical examination questionnaire completed as part of his
application for employment. Trico moved for summary judgment, alleg-
ing that it would not have hired Montiel had it known of Montiel's false
statements that he had never been treated for alcoholism. The appellate
court held that the after-acquired evidence doctrine did not apply to re-
taliatory discharge claims in Texas. The Texas Supreme Court held that
the after-acquired evidence doctrine can in fact act as a limitation on an
360. See Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & Darling Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 938-42(N.D. Tex. 1991) (workers' compensation retaliation claim could be entertained when pen-
dent to a related and removable federal question claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
361. 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 383, 1998 WL 58985 (Feb. 13, 1998).
362. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1996).
363. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, repealed by Act of July 17, 1993, 73rd Leg.,
R.S., ch. 269, § 5(1), 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3288 (Vernon).
364. See Bouchet, 1998 WL 58985, at *1.
365. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401.001-.023 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1998).
366. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1998).
367. See Bouchet, 1998 WL 58985, at *2-5.
368. Id. at *3 (quoting House Comm. on Judiciary, Bill analysis, Tex. H.B. 113, 62d
Leg., R.S. (1971)).
369. Id. at *4.
370. 949 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1997).
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employee's recovery for a retaliatory discharge claim brought through the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act.371 The Court held that if an "em-
ployer establishes that an employee's misconduct was so severe that the
employee would have been legitimately discharged solely on that basis,
after-acquired evidence of the employee's misconduct bars reinstatement
and recovery of actual damages for the period [of time] after the em-
ployer discovered the grounds for termination. ' 372 Absent extraordinary
circumstances, the employee will only be entitled to back pay from the
date of the unlawful termination to the date that the employer discovered
the misconduct.373
In Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of El Paso, Inc. v. Flores,374
George Flores sued his former employer, alleging that he was terminated
for filing a workers' compensation claim. Flores hurt his wrist when
working for Burlington's distribution center in El Paso. He was off work
for about two weeks when he was ordered back to work. His employer
told him that they would take care of the fact that he had not been re-
leased to work. Flores went back to work for three weeks without a doc-
tor's release and reinjured his wrist. He again went off work and was
again told that he had to come back and that his employer would take
care of getting him a release. When he came back, he was reassigned to
another job because of a layoff that occurred while he was out. He did
not consider his new job light duty, as his work release required. Later,
Flores was reassigned to seasonal duties in a retail store and was then laid
off when other temporary Christmas season workers were laid off be-
cause he was now considered part-time, although he had always been full-
time before. His workers' compensation claim settled five days before his
layoff. His wrist injury was taken into account in the decision to layoff
because there were no light duty jobs available to assign Flores to once
the seasonal work ended. Flores was awarded both actual and punitive
damages at trial. On appeal, the court found there was sufficient evi-
dence to infer Flores was terminated for filing a workers' compensation
claim. 375 The court noted that to impose punitive damages, however,
there must have been evidence of ill-will, spite, or specific intent to cause
injury to Flores.376 As no such evidence existed, the court affirmed the
award of actual damages and reversed the award of punitive damages. 377
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holland,378 Bettie Jo Holland sued her for-
mer employer, Wal-Mart, alleging that she was discharged for filing a
workers' compensation claim. In October of 1988, while working as a
stocker, she injured her back, but was not placed on light duty or taken
371. See id. at 312.
372. Id.
373. See id.
374. 951 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, n.w.h.).
375. See id. at 547.
376. See id. at 548.
377. See id. at 549.
378. No. 12-96-00015-CV, 1997 WL 429913 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, no writ).
[Vol. 51
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
off work by her doctor. She told her employer that she could not do
heavy lifting but then aggravated her injury after being told to do her job
or go home. She was taken off the job for seven days and given a light
duty restriction. Before returning to work, her doctor told Wal-Mart that
she needed a three month leave. Wal-Mart offered her a light duty job
several months after the injury. Holland's doctor went to Wal-Mart to
investigate the requirements of the light duty job and determined that the
job was not suitable. Wal-Mart did not file an Employer's First Report of
Injury until after Holland hired an attorney, claiming that Holland never
reported a work-related injury. There was also testimony that Wal-Mart
generally was hostile to workers' compensation claims and that managers
were told to reduce claims. The appellate court affirmed the jury finding
that Holland was discriminated against for filing a workers' compensation
claim. 379 The court noted that after being injured, Holland was given
more strenuous jobs than usual, and that when Holland was told to do the
job or go home, it was meant as a threat of termination.380
Holland was also awarded damages for physical impairment. Wal-Mart
argued that Holland's physical impairment was part of her underlying
compensation claim and taken care of by the settlement with the workers'
compensation carrier. The court conceded that Wal-Mart's contention
may be correct, but overruled Wal-Mart's argument because Wal-Mart
failed to plead the affirmative defense of settlement and release.381 The
court did, however, agree with Wal-Mart that punitive damages were not
proper in this case. 382 The court found no evidence that Wal-Mart in-
tended to cause substantial injury to Holland, or that Wal-Mart acted
with flagrant disregard or actual awareness that its acts would result in
human death or great bodily harm.383 Finally, the court further held that
Holland was entitled to recover her attorneys' fees because the Workers'
Compensation Act allows for recovery of all reasonable damages, which
would include attorneys' fees as they are necessary to make the plaintiff
whole.3
84
In Martin v. Texas Dental Plans, Inc.,385 Charles Martin sued his former
employer, alleging that he was fired for filing a workers' compensation
claim. Martin worked as a typesetter and began to suffer from migraine
headaches, which he attributed to sub-standard computer monitors. The
employer subsequently purchased a new computer system, which resulted
in the elimination of Martin's position. Martin was offered a lower pay-
ing position, which he accepted. Shortly after his reassignment, Martin
filed a complaint with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission.
He was terminated six days later. The jury found that Martin was dis-
379. See id. at *4.
380. See id.
381. See id. at *5.
382. See id. at *6.
383. See id.
384. See id. at *9.
385. 948 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
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charged in violation of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, but that he
suffered no actual damages. However, the jury did find that the discharge
was malicious and awarded punitive damages. The trial court entered a
take nothing judgment against Martin because the jury found no actual
damages. The appellate court upheld the denial of punitive damages but
rendered judgment that Martin be reinstated.386 The employer argued
that the remedies of reinstatement and actual damages are duplicative,
and that Martin, because he only requested monetary damages in the jury
charge, could not seek reinstatement after the jury determined he suf-
fered no monetary damages. 387 The court held that the statute entitles a
plaintiff to reinstatement where a violation of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is found and, therefore, Martin was entitled to reinstatement. 388
Martin's award of punitive damages failed, however, because no actual
damages were found. The remedy of reinstatement could not support a
punitive damage award because no jury finding was secured on the value
of reinstatement. 389
In Porterfield v. Galen Hospital Corp.,390 Anita Porterfield alleged that
she was unlawfully terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim in
violation of section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code. Her supervisor
Donna Torbet and employer Galen Hospital Corporation (Galen)
claimed that Porterfield was dismissed in a general staff reduction along
with twenty-four other employees. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Torbet and Galen on Porterfield's claims.391 In attempt-
ing to establish a causal connection between her workers' compensation
claim and her termination, Porterfield pointed out that prior to her injury,
she was told she was a valuable employee and promised a raise. After
her injury, Porterfield claimed that: (1) Torbet was hostile to her; (2)
Torbet delayed submitting her claim to the insurance carrier; (3) Torbet
contested the claim; and (4) she was fired on the first working day after
she was notified her claim was compensable. In contrast, Torbet and Ga-
len pointed out that Porterfield was dismissed in a general reduction in
force guided by neutral personnel policies. Torbet was told to eliminate
one person from her department, and her manager's manual instructed
her to first maintain established services and the skills to provide those
services. After evaluation, Torbet decided to eliminate one of the three
research coordinators (Porterfield's job) and keep the remaining research
coordinators as well as the administrative assistant and the education co-
ordinator. There was also a layoff sequence in the manual, with the final
consideration being seniority. Torbet and Galen pointed out that
Porterfield was the least senior of the three research coordinators, and
thus, in keeping with the manual, she was dismissed.
386. See id. at 806.
387. See id. at 803.
388. See id. at 804.
389. See id. at 805.
390. 948 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
391. See id. at 918.
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In reversing the summary judgment, the court of appeals noted that
mere evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for Porterfield's termina-
tion did not entitle Torbet and Galen to summary judgment.392 Summary
judgment would only be proper where the defendant established a non-
discriminatory reason and the plaintiff put forward no evidence of a retal-
iatory motive.393 The court pointed out that Porterfield's claim was
submitted to the insurance carrier with the notation that it was not com-
pensable, but the carrier independently determined that it was. This dis-
pute over coverage, coupled with the temporal proximity between the
filing of the compensation claim and Porterfield's dismissal, created a fact
issue over whether Porterfield would have been fired if she had not filed
her workers' compensation claim.394 Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's award of summary judgment on Porterfield's
workers' compensation claim.395
In Duhon v. Bone & Joint Physical Therapy Clinics,396 Beatrice Duhon
suffered an on-the-job injury, which she reported to her supervisor. She
did not miss any work as a result of the injury and no workers' compensa-
tion claim was filed at the time. Approximately four months after the
injury, Duhon was laid off from her position with Bone & Joint Physical
Therapy Clinics (Clinic), allegedly to allow the hiring of a licensed physi-
cal therapist. During the meeting in which she was terminated, Duhon's
supervisor advised her that he would file a workers' compensation claim
with regard to the prior injury. Approximately one-and-a-half months
after Duhon's termination, and some five-and-a-half months after the in-
jury, the Clinic filed its First Report of Injury. Duhon received workers'
compensation benefits as a result of her injury. Duhon then sued the
Clinic alleging workers' compensation retaliation. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Clinic, and Duhon
appealed. 397
On appeal, the Clinic argued that Duhon's workers' compensation
claim could not have been causally related to her termination because she
had already been discharged when the claim was filed. The court dis-
agreed, holding that the act of informing the employer of the injury suffi-
ciently institutes a compensation proceeding for the purposes of the
workers' compensation retaliation statute. 398 The court also concluded
that Duhon raised a fact question as to whether her termination was
caused by her injury.399 The court noted that Duhon had introduced evi-
dence that, shortly after the injury, Duhon's supervisor told her that if she
filed a workers' compensation claim, he did not have to keep Duhon as
392. See id. at 919.
393. See id.
394. See id. at 919-20.
395. See id. at 920.
396. 947 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ).
397. See id. at 317.
398. See id. at 318.
399. See id. at 319.
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an employee and that Duhon could not support her children on workers'
compensation.400 Duhon claimed that she did not take time off following
her injury because she feared she would lose her job.40 1 In addition to
this direct evidence of retaliation, there was also the circumstantial evi-
dence that Duhon was terminated only three months after the supervisor
took Duhon's MRI to a physician and was told that Duhon's condition
was serious and would require surgery. Furthermore, there was evidence
that physical therapy aides with no experience were hired after Duhon's
termination. Concluding that Duhon had introduced direct and circum-
stantial evidence sufficient to raise "a fact issue as to whether ... [the
workers'] compensation claim was such that, without it, the Clinic's con-
duct in terminating her employment would not have occurred when it
did," the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and
remanded the case for trial.402
In Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. Boyd,403 Norman Boyd sued Fluor Daniel for
illegally terminating him in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim. After a bifurcated trial, the jury awarded Boyd actual and punitive
damages and Fluor Daniel appealed. Fluor Daniel complained of error
in the jury charge. The court of appeals noted that, although there was
conflicting evidence as to Fluor Daniel's attitude towards injured work-
ers, there was no dispute that at the time Boyd was laid off, he had not
missed any work, filed a workers' compensation claim, nor hired an attor-
ney.40 4 Fluor Daniel complained that the following instruction was an
improper comment on the weight of the evidence: "In answering this
special issue, you are instructed that informing a supervisor of an on-the-
job injury and requesting and receiving medical care for that injury
maybe [sic] institution of a claim under the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Act. '405
The court of appeals pointed out that the Texas Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that a "jury charge for a statutory cause of action should
track the statutory language as closely as possible. '40 6 The court noted
that the disputed instruction departed from the statutory language and
that no court had approved the use of this instruction or a similar one.40 7
Furthermore, the court held that the instruction was not necessary to en-
able the jury to decide the case and that the instruction placed undue
emphasis on "an extraneous factor to be considered by the jury in reach-
ing its verdict. '408 The court of appeals held that the error in submitting
the instruction was not harmless because the question of whether Boyd
had instituted a workers' compensation proceeding was a closely con-
400. See id.
401. See id.
402. Id. at 320.
403. 941 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
404. See id. at 293-94.
405. Id. at 294.
406. Id. at 295.
407. See id. at 295-96.
408. Id. at 296.
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tested issue.40 9 "The effect of the improper instruction was to inform the
jury that it could consider certain uncontested facts as a sufficient predi-
cate for Boyd's wrongful termination claim."'410 Accordingly, the court
remanded the case for a new trial.411
In Heinsohn v. Trans-Con Adjustment Bureau,412 Robert Heinsohn
sued Trans-Con Adjustment Bureau (Trans-Con) alleging that the com-
pany illegally fired him in anticipation of him filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim. The trial court granted Trans-Con's motion for directed
verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence of damages, and Hein-
sohn appealed. In discussing Heinsohn's claim, the court of appeals
noted that an employer may not frustrate the purposes of the workers'
compensation law by firing an employee before he has an opportunity to
file a claim. 413 To that end, merely notifying an employer of an injury has
been held to have constituted taking steps toward "instituting a compen-
sation proceeding" for purposes of the statute.414 The court pointed out
that after Heinsohn injured his back when a chair he was sitting in col-
lapsed, the company's owner overheard him mention workers' compensa-
tion and told Heinsohn that if he filed a claim, he would be fired.415
Approximately a week later, Heinsohn told the owner that his back still
hurt and that he would need to see a doctor and file a workers' compen-
sation claim. Heinsohn was terminated that afternoon. Heinsohn also
put forth direct documentary evidence of the amount of money he earned
while employed by Trans-Con and the amounts he earned from tempo-
rary jobs held after the company fired him. Consequently, the court held
that there was "more than a scintilla" of evidence to support the submis-
sion of jury issues on whether Heinsohn was illegally fired for filing a
worker's compensation claim and, if so, whether it caused him any loss of
wages as damages.416 As a result, the court of appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial.417
In Trevino v. Kent County,418 Sylvia Trevino, who worked as a house-
keeper in a nursing home run by Kent County (County), brought suit
against the County alleging that she had been fired in retaliation for filing
a workers' compensation claim. After a jury verdict in favor of the
County, Trevino appealed. 419 On appeal, Trevino asserted that the evi-
dence established as a matter of law that she had been fired because she
filed a workers' compensation claim. Such evidence included actions by
the administrator of the home, Kathy Lisenbee, such as: (1) dismissing
409. See id.
410. Id.
411. See id. at 297.
412. 939 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
413. See id. at 795.
414. Id.
415. See id.
416. Id. at 796.
417. See id.
418. 936 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
419. See id. at 489.
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Trevino on a medical leave of absence without Trevino submitting a writ-
ten request; (2) failing to reinstate Trevino to full time status when re-
leased by her doctor to perform light duty work; (3) contacting Trevino's
physicians to determine what kind of work she could do; (4) reinstating
Trevino only on an as-needed basis after Trevino submitted another ap-
plication; (5) requiring Trevino to undergo retraining; and (6) failing to
immediately create a full-time job for Trevino or offer Trevino her previ-
ous job. The court, however, pointed out how this circumstantial evi-
dence was in conflict with evidence put forth by the County.420
Specifically, the County asserted that: (1) Trevino had never been termi-
nated but had been placed on a medical leave of absence; (2) Trevino's
employment did not end until she unilaterally quit after the County of-
fered her a permanent, part-time position; (3) the additional application
was a method of updating the employee's personal information; (4) the
retraining was meant to acclimate Trevino to a new supervisor, as she had
had difficulty in getting along with her previous supervisor, and to warn
her about new cleaning chemicals being used; (5) Trevino could not be
put back into her old position or a full-time light duty position because
neither one existed; and (6) reinstating Trevino as a housekeeper before
she obtained a "100% release" from her doctor was untenable because
Trevino asserted that she could not perform several of the functions es-
sential to her position. Going further, the court noted that Lisenbee
claimed that Trevino's physicians were contacted to determine what, if
anything, Trevino could do and that placing Trevino on full-time status
would occur as soon as a position became available. 421 Finally, Trevino
brought forward no evidence to contradict Lisenbee's assertion that Tre-
vino had been treated the same as other employees who were absent for
many months. Noting that the employer may deny work to those incapa-
ble of performing the job and need not fire anyone or create a new posi-
tion to avoid liability absent discriminatory motives, the court concluded
that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient for them to con-
clude that the County did not reinstate Trevino as a housekeeper solely
because she was unable to perform the job or because the position was
unavailable. 422 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
4 2 3
In Johnson v. Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services,424 Ceola Johnson
claimed that Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services (Bethesda) fired
her for filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of section
451.001 of the Texas Labor Code. Bethesda moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that Johnson had a felony criminal conviction which
she failed to disclose in response to a question on her employment appli-
cation, and that Bethesda would not have hired her had it known about
420. See id. at 492.
421. See id. at 493.
422. See id.
423. See id. at 494.
424. 935 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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the lie on her employment application. Bethesda's motion was granted
and Johnson appealed. 425 On appeal, the court focused on the affidavit
of Bethesda's personnel director, who stated that Bethesda would not
have hired Johnson if it had known of her felony conviction or if Johnson
had disclosed the conviction on her application. 426 Also, the personnel
director's affidavit stated that Bethesda would have immediately termi-
nated Johnson had it learned that she had falsified her employment appli-
cation. The court held that the affidavit did not meet the standard
necessary for summary judgment proof put forward by interested wit-
nesses because it could not be easily controverted, and because the affida-
vit was controverted by the fact that Bethesda had Johnson sign a
document giving permission to investigate her criminal history but chose
not to do so. 42 7 Also, Johnson put forth an affidavit stating that she be-
lieved her sentence was not a prior conviction because it was probated,
which created a fact question regarding whether she knew her conviction
was in fact a conviction. Consequently, along with the fact issue regard-
ing her conviction, the court held that there also existed genuine issues of
material fact concerning whether Johnson would have been hired if she
had disclosed her conviction on her application and whether Bethesda
would have fired Johnson had it discovered Johnson's prior conviction
after she was hired.428
The court of appeals held that "the after-acquired evidence doctrine
only applies to damages in anti-retaliation law claims. ' 429 Additionally,
the court held that the doctrine "bars reinstatement and recovery of ac-
tual damages after the point in time that the employer discovered the
falsified employment application which led to the employment.
' 430
In Graef v. Chemical Leaman Corp.,431 James Graef sued his former
employer for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act. Graef was a truck driver and injured his shoulder
and forearm on December 21, 1990. He received workers' compensation
benefits through April 1994, when he settled his claim for a lump sum.
He remained out of work for nearly three years. While out, his Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) medical certificate expired and he failed
his physical. Graef was subsequently removed from the seniority rolls, in
accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement which
provided that absence from the job for more than three years due to in-
jury or illness results in the loss of seniority. Graef filed a grievance, pro-
testing his removal from the seniority roster. The arbitrator denied
Graef's grievance. At the retaliation trial, Graef claimed that his em-
ployer engaged in delaying tactics to allow the three year anniversary of
425. See id. at 236.
426. See id.
427. See id. at 236-37.
428. See id. at 237.
429. Id. at 238.
430. Id.
431. 106 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1997).
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his absence to pass and that the employer's physician had predetermined
that Graef could not pass the DOT physical. Graef prevailed at trial.
The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial,432 finding the
arbitration decision to be relevant and highly probative of the employer's
defense that it removed Graef from the seniority roster pursuant to the
neutral and binding requirements of the CBA.433 The appellate court re-
jected Graef's argument that the arbitration decision was immaterial be-
cause even if other reasons exist, a plaintiff may still recover if retaliation
is also a reason. 434 The court noted that Graef had to show that but for
the workers' compensation claim, he would not have been removed from
the seniority rolls.435 The employer sought to refute this claim by estab-
lishing that the CBA required Graef's removal and that the workers'
compensation claim played no role. Thus, the arbitration decision was
central to the employer's defense. 436
In Piper v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. ,437 Linda Piper worked for Kimberly-
Clark Corporation as a store clerk, a job that required a twelve-hour
shift. Piper injured her back on the job and her doctor imposed restric-
tions on her return to work, namely that she was not to work more than
eight hours per day. Kimberly-Clark fired Piper, alleging that there were
no jobs available at the plant consistent with her permanent eight hour
restriction. Piper brought suit under section 451.001 of the Texas Labor
Code, which prohibits an employer from discharging or retaliating against
an employee because the employee has filed a workers' compensation
claim in good faith. Kimberly-Clark claimed that summary judgment was
proper on Piper's claim because Piper had failed to present any evidence
of a causal connection between the filing of the workers' compensation
claim and her discharge. Piper countered this with a laundry list of cir-
cumstantial evidence to support her retaliation claim. The court recog-
nized that Piper could prove causation by direct or circumstantial
evidence, and, despite her failure to direct the court to specific portions
of the record to support her claim, the court assumed that Piper had es-
tablished the causal connection.438 However, Piper was unable to come
forward with any evidence to rebut Kimberly-Clark's showing that it had
fired Piper for a reason unrelated to her workers' compensation claim.
Specifically, Kimberly-Clark asserted that Piper had been fired because
there were no jobs available at the plant that were consistent with her
permanent eight hour restriction. Piper failed to controvert this legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason with evidence of a retaliatory motive,
specifically failing to prove that the twelve-hour shift was anything but
essential to the function of a store clerk and that there were eight-hour
432. See id. at 114.
433. See id. at 117.
434. See id.
435. See id. at 118.
436. See id.
437. 970 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
438. See id. at 575.
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jobs available that she was qualified for at the time of her discharge.
Consequently, the court held that summary judgment was appropriate as
to Piper's retaliatory discharge claim. 439
In Johnson v. Alcatel Network Systems, Inc.,440 Peggy Johnson sued her
former employer for wrongful termination in violation of the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act. After being injured on the job and while
out on leave, Johnson was found working in a flea market and disobeying
her work restriction orders. The company viewed these as a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement and terminated her. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the company, holding that the Labor
Management Relations Act preempted Johnson's claim. Johnson's claim
of workers' compensation retaliation was dependent on and inextricably
intertwined with interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 441
In McGaskey v. Hospital Housekeeping Systems of Houston, Inc.,442
Tracy McGaskey sued her former employer, a nonsubscriber to the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act for retaliatory discharge under the Act. Mc-
Gaskey slipped and fell at her place of employment and injured her knee
and wrist. One month after the injury, she was released to full time work,
but she consulted with another doctor who gave her a no-work slip. The
employer terminated McGaskey when she did not return to work when
she was given her full release and terminated her benefits under its Em-
ployee Injury Benefit Plan (Plan), an ERISA plan. McGaskey's failure to
return to work after receiving a full release from a Plan provider violated
the terms of the Plan. The court held that McGaskey's state law claims
were preempted by ERISA.443 The court found the issue to be whether
McGaskey's claims would cease to exist if they were stripped of their link
to the plan.444 McGaskey's claim was essentially that she was terminated
in retaliation for asserting a right to refuse to work and to continue to
receive Plan disability benefits. Thus, McGaskey's claims arose from and
depended on the existence of the ERISA plan.445
In Housing Authority v. Guerra,446 George Guerra claimed that he was
fired by the Housing Authority for the City of El Paso (Housing Author-
ity) for filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of section
451.001 of the Texas Labor Code. A jury awarded Guerra $66,000 in
damages and the Housing Authority appealed, claiming that there was no
evidence of causation to support a finding of liability.447 After reviewing
the record, the court of appeals held that there was more than a scintilla
of evidence to support the jury's finding that Guerra was wrongfully dis-
439. See id.
440. 963 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
441. See id. at 604.
442. 942 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
443. See id. at 1125.
444. See id.
445. See id.
446. No. 08-96-00112-CV, 1998 WL 79689 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso Feb. 26, 1998, no pet.
h.).
447. See id. at *2.
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charged by the Housing Authority.448 In addition to Guerra being fired
after giving notice of his injury to the Housing Authority, (conduct suffi-
cient to invoke the protections of the Code), there was other evidence
from which the jury could conclude, in its discretion, that Guerra had
been fired for filing a workers' compensation claim.449 For one, Guerra's
supervisor Joe Robles allegedly told Guerra, after he had been injured,
that he might as well leave his tools, that his job had just ended, and
anybody in workers' compensation is cut out from the job. Such a state-
ment showed more than a subjective belief, which alone would not be
enough to support a causal connection between the filing of a claim and
termination, on the part of Guerra and, despite Robles denying making
the statement, the jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve that the state-
ment was made. 450 Furthermore, the jury heard conflicting testimony
from employees of the Housing Authority regarding the reason for
Guerra's termination ranging from Guerra's medical limitations to pro-
ject completion. After reviewing the record, the court of appeals held
that there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support a finding of
liability.451
2. Commission on Human Rights
In Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. v. Flores,452 Borg-Warner, a
large security firm, appealed from a judgment awarded Amelia Flores for
various common law and statutory claims for sexual harassment and in-
tentional torts. Flores' supervisor at Borg-Warner's McAllen office was
Santiago Gonzales. Extensive testimony was introduced as to the mis-
deeds of Mr. Gonzales, such as his fondling of female employees. Com-
plaints to Borg-Warner regarding Gonzales were ignored or discounted
and Gonzales was never reprimanded. Flores, from the outset of her em-
ployment with Borg-Warner, was a target of Gonzales' advances, includ-
ing asking her for sexual favors and showing up at her home intoxicated
and attempting to forcibly remove her skirt. On one afternoon in mid-
August 1993, Gonzales asked Flores to accompany him to the site of a
reported auto theft, ostensibly to train her. However, en route to the
investigation, Gonzales detoured onto a dirt road and raped Flores, in-
fecting her with gonorrhea. Flores attempted to call the office to report
the incident, but all her calls were answered by Gonzales. Finally, Flores
reported the incident to a client and a co-worker. Upon learning of the
incident, Borg-Warner offered Flores a few days off to compose herself.
Flores declined the offer and resigned. Gonzales was placed on adminis-
trative leave and eventually terminated, although the date of his termina-
tion was unclear. Flores was informed of Gonzales being placed on
448. See id.
449. See id. at *3.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. 955 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet. h.).
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administrative leave early in September of 1993, but she claimed that she
did not learn of Gonzales' termination until March of 1995. 453
Gonzales sued for constructive discharge. In addition to setting forth
the elements of a constructive discharge claim, the court noted that it was
important to examine the conditions imposed by the employer, not the
employer's subjective intent.454 In upholding Flores' constructive dis-
charge claim under chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, the court held
that the mere fact that the rape occurred established a case of construc-
tive discharge.455 Moreover, the undisputed facts, that Flores was raped
by her immediate supervisor in the course of an ostensible business out-
ing, established that Gonzales' conduct was clearly attributable to Borg-
Warner under the common law agency principle of apparent authority.456
Furthermore, even if the rape itself were found not to have made condi-
tions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt reasonably
compelled to resign, the court found that Borg-Warner's response of in-
forming Flores that Gonzales was on administrative leave (which the
court referred to as "administrative jargon"), "was certainly (and perhaps
purposefully) ambiguous. '457
Concluding that "simple arithmetic" supported an award of back pay,
the court turned to front pay.458 The court noted that chapter 21 of the
Texas Labor Code did not specifically mention front pay, although the
power to grant appropriate equitable relief was specifically conferred.459
The court found that as one of the purposes of chapter 21 of the Texas
Labor Code was to correlate state law to its federal counterpart, the ap-
propriate ruling was to follow federal Title VII case law and allow front
pay as a legitimate exercise of the trial court's equity powers. 460 As Flo-
res had testified that she would have remained a security guard until re-
tirement and as the jury was entitled to believe her, some evidence
supported the award of front pay, thus the award was not clearly wrong
and unjust. 461
Again following federal Title VII precedent, the court held that chapter
21 of the Texas Labor Code could not be interpreted to "preclude the
very important function of common law remedies for intentional torts
such as battery. '462 The court also held that use of the lodestar method
of calculating attorneys' fees was appropriate, as was, in this case, the use
of a multiplier of 1.5 to upwardly adjust the fee award.463 The court
pointed out that attorneys' fees were awarded as "costs" under chapter 21
453. See id. at 864.
454. See id. at 866.
455. See id. at 867.
456. See id. at 866.





462. Id. at 868.
463. See id. at 870.
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of the Texas Labor Code, just as they were in Title VII cases, and that the
trial court was the appropriate authority to determine these amounts.
464
A lengthy dissent disagreed with the finding of constructive discharge,
concluding instead that the placement of Gonzalez on administrative
leave was a reasonable enough response to deny any claim of intolerable
conditions, placing Flores under a duty to retain her position until more
permanent solutions could be worked out.465
In Hearne v. Amwest Savings Assoc.,466 Caren Hearne sued her former
employer, claiming that she was discharged due to her disability in viola-
tion of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). In 1991,
Hearne was hired as a bank teller for Amwest. A year later, she was
diagnosed with diabetes and was required to take daily insulin shots. No
restrictions were placed on her ability to work. In 1993, Amwest installed
a new computer system and all employees were required to attend train-
ing. Hearne asked to be excused, but was told that if she missed the
training she would be fired. She did not attend and never returned to
work. The trial court granted summary judgment for Amwest. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the summary judgment, finding there was no mate-
rial fact issue on the question of whether Hearne was disabled under the
TCHRA.467 The court turned to the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) for guidance on the issue of disability.4 68 The court noted that
"insulin dependency alone does not render a diabetic per se disabled
under the ADA," and found that Hearne was not limited in a "major life
activity" such as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. 469
In Primeaux v. Conoco, Inc.,470 Patrick Primeaux sued his former em-
ployer for disability discrimination. Primeaux injured his back while
working for Conoco and was unable to return to his duties as a driver.
He worked light duty assignments instead. Conoco had a policy under
which it terminated employees unable to return to their regular duties
after one year unless they showed that they would be released to their
regular duty within a few days after receiving notice of their effective
termination date. Primeaux was terminated pursuant to this policy. Ap-
proximately a year and a half after his injury, he sought reemployment
from Conoco, but was not hired. At that time, his only restriction was not
to lift any weight of forty pounds or more. The appellate court reversed
the trial court's summary judgment that Primeaux was not disabled.471
Disability under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA)
means, among other things, a mental or physical impairment that sub-
464. See id.
465. See id. at 874.
466. 951 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet. h.).
467. See id. at 954.
468. See id. at 953.
469. Id. at 953-54.
470. No. 01-96-01134-CV, 1997 WL 474445 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21,
1997, n.w.h.).
471. See id. at *6.
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stantially limits at least one major life activity. 472 For the major life activ-
ity of working, an individual need not be totally incapable of performing
any job in order to fit within the definition of disability.473 Primeaux was
thirty-two years old, worked as a truck driver for fourteen years and only
had a high school education. His physical impairment and limited educa-
tion raised a fact issue regarding whether his lifting restriction amounted
to a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.474 The
court held that the evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue as to
whether Primeaux was significantly restricted in the ability to perform a
class of jobs when compared with the ability of the average person with
comparable qualifications to perform those same jobs, and thus dis-
abled. 475 The court rejected Conoco's legitimate non-discriminatory de-
fense of not hiring Primeaux because no jobs were available, finding
direct evidence that Primeaux was not considered for a job because of his
impairment .476
In O'Bryant v. City of Midland,477 officer Milton O'Bryant was work-
ing for the Midland Police Department (Department) when he suffered a
back injury while performing a physical strength test. In 1992, O'Bryant
sued the Department under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 1993,
the Department instituted a temporary light duty policy for injured of-
ficers and discussed "civilianizing" some of its positions. O'Bryant was
put on light duty status and sued the Department in a class action claim-
ing employment discrimination, which was later dismissed by the class.
After the class action was filed, officers who participated in the class al-
leged a host of retaliatory activities as a result of their participation in the
first two lawsuits. The instant lawsuit followed, alleging unlawful employ-
ment discrimination and retaliation in violation of sections 21.051 and
21.055 of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The
trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, and
the officers appealed. 478
The court of appeals noted that a person complaining of unlawful em-
ployment actions prohibited by the TCHRA must exhaust their adminis-
trative remedies before filing suit, which would involve filing a complaint
with the TCHR within 180 days of the alleged offense. 479 Filing of a com-
plaint is a mandatory, jurisdictional prerequisite for the assertion of
claims under these sections of the TCHRA.480 "Furthermore, a person
who has initiated a civil action in a court of law based on an allegedly
unlawful employment practice may not file a complaint under the Labor
472. See id. at *2.
473. See id. at *4.
474. See id. at *5.
475. See id.
476. See id. at *6.
477. 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).
478. See id. at 409.




Code for the same grievance. '481 Because the officers failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies and took advantage of alternate civil relief,
the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the officers' claims
under the TCHRA.482 Consequently, the court of appeals vacated the
trial court's judgment on this issue and dismissed the TCHRA causes of
action. 483
In Mayberry v. Texas Department of Agriculture,484 Tanya Mayberry
sued the Texas Department of Agriculture (Department) for racial dis-
crimination and retaliation for giving testimony in a sexual harassment
suit in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
(TCHRA). After filing her lawsuit, Mayberry alleged further retaliation
by the Department and amended her pleadings to reflect these allega-
tions. Two weeks before trial, Mayberry again amended her pleadings to
seek compensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress.
At trial, Mayberry won a jury verdict on the issue of retaliation but was
not allowed to present evidence of the extent of her mental and emo-
tional damages. Both sides appealed. 485 Mayberry challenged the refusal
of the trial court to let her introduce evidence of compensatory damages.
The court of appeals noted that, under the version of the TCHRA in
effect when Mayberry filed her complaint with the Commission on
Human Rights (the Commission), only equitable relief was allowed for
unlawful employment practices.486 Although the Legislature amended
the statute to allow for the recovery of compensatory damages, Mayberry
conceded that the statute, which covered only complaints filed on or after
September 1, 1993, did not cover the conduct alleged in her May 1993
complaint. However, Mayberry claimed that she should be able to re-
cover compensatory damages for the retaliatory conduct contained in her
amended pleading because these events occurred after the 1993 amend-
ment. Nonetheless, the court agreed with the position of the Department
that Mayberry was not entitled to recover "compensatory damages for
the post-amendment conduct because she never filed a complaint with
the Commission based on that conduct after the amendment took ef-
fect."'487 In order to avail herself of the remedies provided by the amend-
ment, Mayberry would have had to file a complaint alleging the new
conduct after the amendment took effect.488 Furthermore, the court
found no authority for Mayberry's argument that her post-statutory-
amendment claims should be allowed to piggyback on her earlier com-
plaint for some purposes, like conferring jurisdiction, but not for others,




484. 948 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
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amendment complaint to the Commission, the court of appeals held that
the trial court properly excluded Mayberry's proffered evidence of
mental and emotional damages.490
The court of appeals also rejected the Department's contention that
there was no legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of retaliation
for filing a complaint with the Commission.491 For example, Mayberry
received lower evaluation marks than she had in previous years after she
filed her complaint. Also, one of her evaluations was delayed five
months after its due date, and she was not eligible for a pay increase
unless she had a current evaluation. Additionally, one Department em-
ployee testified that he told Mayberry's supervisor not to compile her
evaluation when due because of her pending complaint. Nonetheless, the
Department attempted to argue that these actions did not constitute ad-
verse employment actions because they did not negatively impact her sal-
ary or benefits. However, the court of appeals held that the evidence
supported the conclusion that Mayberry would have been eligible for a
raise, and might even have received one, if not for the Department post-
poning her evaluation based on her complaint. 492
In Tanik v. Southern Methodist University,493 Murat Tanik sued his for-
mer employer, Southern Methodist University (SMU) for race and na-
tional origin discrimination in violation of the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of SMU, and Mr. Tanik appealed. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
noted that tenure decisions involve considerations that set them apart
from other employment decisions inasmuch as tenure contracts: (1) re-
quire unusual commitments as to time and collegial relationships; (2) are
often non-competitive; (3) are usually highly decentralized; (4) involve
the consideration of extensive factors; and (5) are a source of unusually
great disagreement.494 The court noted, however, that a plaintiff presents
a prima facie case if able to show "departures from procedural regularity,
conventional evidence of bias on the part of individuals involved, or that
the [individual] is found to be qualified for tenure by some significant
portion of the departmental faculty, referrants, or other scholars in a par-
ticular field." 495 With that groundwork, and with no additional discussion
of the particular facts at issue, the court held that, considering the unique
nature of the tenure decision, there was no evidence that discrimination
influenced SMU's tenure decision; moreover, SMU presented a legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason for Tanik's termination.496 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. 497
490. See id.
491. See id. at 316.
492. See id.
493. 116 F.3d 775 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 600 (1997).






In Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc. ,498 Therese Scribner sued her former
employer, Waffle House, Inc. (Waffle House) for, among other things,
sexual harassment and retaliation under the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
case was tried to the bench, and the court awarded Scribner $115,775 for
lost income damages, $358,000 for mental anguish damages, and
$6,300,000 for punitive damages on Scribner's sexual harassment, retalia-
tion, and related tort claims. In addition, the court awarded Scribner
damages in the amount of $1,363,442 on her Equal Pay Act, intentional
interference with contract, and defamation claims.
On appeal, the court detailed the facts surrounding Scribner's claims of
sexual harassment in great length. In summary, various members of up-
per management of Waffle House repeatedly made extremely lewd and
offensive comments to her over the three and a half year period of her
employment. On one occasion, a company manager put a Polaroid cam-
era up Scribner's skirt and took a picture. Another company manager
had repeated and unwelcome physical contact with Scribner, often bump-
ing her breasts, tickling her under her arms, and rubbing his legs against
her thighs.
The court concluded that Waffle House knew or should have known of
the sexual harassment. 499 The court noted that the sexual harassment of
Scribner was actually committed or witnessed by the top officers, execu-
tives, and supervisors of Waffle House, was done openly at company
functions and in company restaurants, and was done before numerous
supervisors, hourly employees, and spouses of employees.500 Further-
more, Scribner complained of the sexual harassment to at least six indi-
viduals in upper management to no avail. Some of her complaints were
specifically reported to the President, CEO, and majority owner of Waffle
House, resulting only in her termination.50 1
The court found that Waffle House failed to take any proper remedial
action.502 The court concluded that shortly after Scribner's reports of
sexual harassment were reported to the company's top management, the
company concocted false reasons to justify her discharge. 503 Moreover,
the court concluded that Waffle House bribed two witnesses by giving
them a store franchise, unsuccessfully attempted to suborn perjury by an-
other witness, and promoted one of the sexual harassers to one of the top
executive positions with Waffle House. 504
498. 976 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1997), modified 1998 WL 47641 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
1998). For a further discussion of Scribner, see supra notes 140-142, 195-208, 270-273 and
accompanying text.
499. See id. at 493.
500. See id. at 493-94.
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With regard to Scribner's claim for retaliation, the court concluded that
Scribner's termination resulted from Scribner's complaints of sexual har-
assment.50 5 The court explained that while Waffle House justified the
termination as resulting from Scribner's poor performance in the area of
recruiting, Scribner never received any negative reviews from her super-
visors, received high marks on her performance evaluation in the area of
recruiting, consistently received pay raises, normally met or came close to
meeting hiring quotas, and received two company awards for excellence
and achievement. 506 Moreover, while Waffle House alleged that Scribner
did not recruit qualified candidates, the evidence showed that Scribner
had no authority to hire candidates and that Scribner was only responsi-
ble for bringing candidates to the attention of management. Waffle
House had no explanation as to why they continued to hire the suppos-
edly inferior candidates presented to them by Scribner. 50 7
In support of the $6,300,000 punitive damage award on Scribner's sex-
ual harassment and retaliation claims, the court explained that the con-
duct of Waffle House was particularly egregious inasmuch as the sexual
harassment was inflicted upon Scribner by many individuals and the indi-
viduals subjecting Scribner to sexual harassment were top managers of
the company. 508 Despite their harassment of Scribner, two company em-
ployees received promotions and a third was awarded a Waffle House
franchise. The acts of sexual harassment were observed by the top execu-
tives of Waffle House, by other supervisors, by hourly employees, and
even by Scribner's neighbors and friends. Although the conduct of the
harassers was in violation of the company's sexual harassment policy,
they were never reprimanded or sanctioned in any way. There was evi-
dence of the prior sexual harassment of another employee, an alleged
rape of a waitress by a manager. Waffle House's attitude toward its sex-
ual harassment was cavalier, evidenced by the failure of company man-
agement to report acts of sexual harassment of Scribner witnessed by
them and evidenced by the company President's loose interpretation of
the policy during his testimony. Finally, rather than admit to the conduct,
the Waffle House witnesses, including the President of the Company, lied
to the Texas Commission on Human Rights, to Scribner's attorney during
depositions and at trial, and to the court during trial, bribed two witnesses
to give perjured testimony, and attempted to suborn perjury by another
witness. 50 9
In Pena v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 51° David Pena sued Hous-
505. See id. at 443.
506. See id. at 443-44.
507. See id. at 476-77.
508. See id. at 504. In its modified opinion, the court also concluded that it properly
based the punitive damage award on "Waffle House's attempts to cover up their repulsive
acts by lying under oath and suborning perjury," noting that "the law in the Fifth Circuit
suggests that such behavior is properly taken into account in establishing punitive dam-
ages." Id. at *4.
509. See id. at 504-07.
510. 978 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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ton Lighting & Power (HLP) for disability discrimination. Pena had an
on-the-job injury and suffered serious injuries to his neck, back and arm.
Pena was permanently disabled and applied for long term disability bene-
fits. He also reported to the Social Security Administration that he was
hampered in all his job duties. He was provided long term disability ben-
efits for being totally disabled. He also applied for mortgage disability
benefits, claiming that he was totally disabled and providing physician
support for the claim. He was terminated on July 26, 1995. The court
held that judicial estoppel barred Pena from asserting that he was a quali-
fied individual with a disability in light of the representation that he made
that he was totally disabled to the Social Security Administration, to the
long-term disability plan, and in his mortgage disability benefits applica-
tion.511 To allow Pena to claim that he was discriminated against because
he is not totally disabled but can perform the essential functions of his job
would permit a fraud on either the Court, the Social Security Administra-
tion, or Pena's own insurance company. 512
In Rifakes v. Citizens Utilities Co., 513 John Rifakes sued Citizens Utili-
ties Company (Citizens), for age discrimination in violation of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Rifakes alleged that his
termination in a company reorganization was illegally based upon his age.
The court noted that the TCHRA correlates state and federal law and
must be read consistently with federal precedent. 514 Consequently, be-
cause the court dismissed Rifakes claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), for the same reasons his TCHRA claims had
to be dismissed.5 15
Analyzing Rifakes claims under the ADEA, the court held that, assum-
ing arguendo, that Rifakes had proved a prima facie case of age discrimi-
nation, Citizens met its burden of producing a legitimate
nondiscriminatory rationale.516 Citizen introduced evidence that Rifakes
was terminated because of a company-wide reorganization that resulted
in Rifakes' job being eliminated and because of employee feedback that
Rifakes and Brenda Parisotto, with whom Rifakes allegedly had a rela-
tionship, were the source of low employee morale in Citizen's Dallas of-
fice.517 As the burden then shifted back to Rifakes to prove pretext,
Rifakes alleged that no reduction in force had occurred because the Dal-
las office had grown substantially since his discharge and the number of
employees in the human resources department where Rifakes worked
was essentially the same. The court discounted the evidence at least in
part because Citizen had actually engaged in a reorganization, rather than
511. See id. at 698.
512. See id. at 699.
513. 968 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1997), affd, 132 F.3d 1453 (5th Cir. 1997).
514. See id. at 320.
515. See id.
516. See id. at 318.
517. See id. at 318-19.
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a reduction in force.518 The court stated that an increase in the number
of employees shortly after layoffs was not inconsistent with a reorganiza-
tion, as opposed to a reduction in force. However, although a close ques-
tion, the court assumed arguendo that Rifakes' termination as part of a
reorganization of the human resources department was pretextual be-
cause the court concluded that other grounds would support summary
judgment. 519 Independent of the reorganization justification, Citizen al-
leged that one reason for Rifakes' termination was the widespread per-
ception among employees that Rifakes and Parisotto were to blame for
low morale in the Dallas office. The fact that there may not have been a
reorganization of the human resources department and that Rifakes and
Parisotto may not have had a relationship did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact that employees perceived him to be a cause of low morale
and that Ronald Spears, the man who made the termination decision,
believed the employee feedback he received. Moreover, while Rifakes
might have shown that his alleged morale problem was a pretext for ter-
minating him, he produced no evidence that the reorganization was a pre-
text for age discrimination. 520
Finally, remarks by Rifakes' superiors that he had a "1970s manage-
ment style" did not constitute evidence of discrimination because they
were uttered by non-decisionmakers. 521 "Additionally, Spears' alleged
comment to Rifakes that there were good internal candidates for the
Connecticut position who were 'young' and might be what Spears was
looking for" was not evidence of age discrimination. 522 According to the
court, it did not appear that Spears considered the candidates favorably
because they were young, but merely used "young" as a descriptive term
not indicative of age bias.523 As the evidence put forth by Rifakes to
establish its prima facie case and to prove pretext was not substantial, a
jury could not reasonably infer discrimination. 524 Consequently, sum-
mary judgment was proper for Citizen on the claims of age
discrimination. 525
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.J. Gallagher
Co.,526 Michael Boyle was promoted from Vice-President of R.J. Gal-
lagher Co. (Gallagher) to President. Mr. Boyle was diagnosed with can-
cer soon after his promotion and, when Mr. Boyle returned to work
following his first chemotherapy treatment, he was demoted back to the
Vice-President position. Mr. Boyle sued, alleging that his demotion was
the result of disability discrimination in violation of the Texas Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
518. See id.
519. See id.
520. See id. at 318-19.





526. 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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court held that while the effects of cancer can leave a person disabled,
cancer itself is not a disability. 527 Because Mr. Boyle's only limitation
was the need to take time off for therapy, Mr. Boyle was not disabled.
Moreover, even if Gallagher perceived Mr. Boyle as being ill, Gallagher
did not perceive Mr. Boyle as having a disability.5
28
In Rios v. Indiana Bayer Corp.,529 Michael Rios sued Indiana Bayer
Corporation (Bayer) alleging that Bayer discriminated against him on the
basis of a disability when it denied him a promotion to the position as a
production technician. The court granted Bayer's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that Mr. Rios was not qualified for the production
technician position because he could not perform the essential functions
of the position and because reasonable accommodations allowing him to
perform the essential functions could not be made.530 When Mr. Rios
applied for the production technician position, he had in effect significant
medical restrictions on his work activities. In addition, Mr. Rios was re-
stricted in stair climbing, ladder climbing, and heavy lifting, all essential
functions of the production technician position. Moreover, Mr. Rios was
restricted to eight-hour shifts and no overtime, while the technician posi-
tion required twelve-hour shifts and overtime one day a week. The court
noted that Mr. Rios could pose a safety risk to himself or others in the
event of an emergency if Mr. Rios was not able to quickly evacuate the
unit or if he was unable to assist another worker by dragging or carrying
him to safety.531 The court also concluded that no reasonable accommo-
dation by Bayer would allow Mr. Rios to perform the essential functions
of the position.532 The court explained that in order to accommodate Mr.
Rios, Bayer would have to eliminate or reallocate essential functions of
the position, which the statute does not require. 533
In Roark v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 5 3 4 Candice Roark brought suit
under the TCHRA against Kidder, Peabody & Co. (Kidder) for hostile
work environment sexual discrimination and for retaliation. The only ac-
tions that Roark claimed constituted sexual harassment were two hugs
(with conflicting evidence as to whether they were offensive) in the spring
of 1994 and two offensive jokes (regarding her sobriety and her attire) in
October of 1994. The court held that two hugs and two jokes did not rise
to the level necessary to maintain a claim for sexual harassment. 535
Pointing to cases of more severe behavior that were held not to be sexual
harassment, the court held that the conduct complained of was neither
frequent nor severe nor threatening, and did not unreasonably interfere
527. See id. at 409.
528. See id.
529. 965 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
530. See id. at 922-23.
531. See id. at 923-24.
532. See id. at 924.
533. See id.
534. 959 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
535. See id. at 384.
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with the plaintiff's work performance. 536 Furthermore, after Roark com-
plained, no further jokes or hugs occurred, which the court considered
prompt remedial action dispelling liability.537 Consequently, the court
granted summary judgment to Kidder on Roark's sexual harassment
claim.538
As to the plaintiff's claim of retaliation, the court found that Roark
engaged in protected activity by complaining about the perceived harass-
ment.539 On the issue of an adverse employment action, the court noted
that only ultimate employment decisions were covered, meaning that Ro-
ark had no retaliation claim for being reprimanded and had no claim if
she resigned, but did have a claim if she was terminated.540 There was
conflicting evidence as to whether Kidder had solicited Roark's resigna-
tion, which would support a retaliation claim, or whether Roark first sug-
gested she resign, creating a disputed fact issue.541 Also, there was a
material fact dispute as to whether Roark had resigned or been fired,
created by evidence such as Roark's deposition and affidavit testimony
that she did not resign, the fact that she called in sick on the four work
days following her alleged date of resignation and the fact that she
presented her own version of a release agreement with an attached letter
indicating that she understood that her resignation was not in effect until
she signed the release.542 Finally, there was a material issue as to the
causal connection between Roark's protected activity and her discharge.
While her alleged harasser was not involved in the decision to discharge
plaintiff, which would normally break the causal link between the com-
plained of action and the retaliatory motives, the court found that it must
consider whether the person who discharged plaintiff had a retaliatory
motive.543 Because Kidder's actions were based on its good faith belief
that plaintiff had resigned, which would involve credibility determinations
concerning plaintiff and the person who discharged her, the trier of fact
was the appropriate party to resolve this issue. 544 Consequently, Kidder's
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim was
denied.545
3. Texas Whistle Blower Act
The Texas Whistle Blower Act,546 protects public employees from dis-
crimination when an employee has in good faith reported a violation of
536. See id.
537. See id. at 385.
538. See id. at 384-85.




543. See id. at 387.
544. See id.
545. See id.
546. TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon 1997).
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law to an appropriate law enforcement authority.547 Notably, the Act
does not require that the reported activity actually be illegal, provided
the employee in good faith believed the conduct was illegal.
548
In City of Brenham v. Honerkamp,549 Russell Honerkamp sued the
City for discharging him in violation of the Texas Whistle Blower Act.
Honerkamp worked for the City as an environmental services manager.
Friction developed when the new superintendent of the water treatment
plant resisted Honerkamp's advice on maintaining required chlorine
level. Honerkamp visited the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) and discussed with them bacteria test sites. The
conflicts between the employees of the water treatment plant culminated
when the City manager informed Honerkamp that he had been termi-
nated. The appellate court affirmed the jury's finding that Honerkamp
was terminated in violation of the Whistle Blower Act.550 A state agency
or local government may not suspend or terminate the employment of or
discriminate against a public employee who in good faith reports a viola-
tion of law to an appropriate law enforcement agency.55 1 Rejecting the
City's argument that Honerkamp did not report a violation, the court
noted that Honerkamp specifically testified that he told the TNRCC that
he did not believe the City's bacteria test sites were properly representa-
tive. 552 Thus, Honerkamp satisfied the reporting requirement of a whistle
blower cause of action. 553 The court also upheld the jury's award of puni-
tive damages, finding actual malice in facts such as Honerkamp's signifi-
cantly lower performance evaluation shortly after the meeting with the
TNRCC, being referred to as having difficulty being a team player, being
accused of having a hidden agenda, and being told to come to the city
manager before going to a regulatory agency in the future.554 Further-
more, the City's knowledge that termination would cause Honerkamp to
be unemployed showed actual awareness that the act would result in sub-
stantial damage. 555
In Lubbock County v. Strube,556 Karen Strube sued Lubbock County,
her employer, alleging retaliation in violation of the Whistle Blower Act.
Strube was a Lubbock County jailer. She was assigned cleaning duties
and told to use cleaning products that were highly corrosive and caused
547. See Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ denied) (jury awarded $13,500,000 to a state employee discharged for reporting
wrongdoings within his agency); Beiser v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 902 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Jones v. City of Stephenville, 896 S.W.2d
574, 577 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ).
548. See Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ
denied).
549. 950 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. filed).
550. See id. at 760.
551. See id. at 763.
552. See id.
553. See id. at 764.
554. See id. at 762.
555. See id. at 770.
556. 953 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. filed).
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her skin to blister. She complained to her superiors and to the Texas
Department of Health, which conducted an investigation. Subsequently,
she began to be treated differently at work, such as not being allowed
time off work to pick up her son, not being given opportunities to work
voluntary overtime, and not being allowed time off for her daughter's
illness. A few months later, she was suspended for ten days and placed
on probation for one year for her part in encouraging another jailer to
slap his golf partner in the department's golf tournament. One other
jailer was disciplined because of this incident. Upon return to work after
the suspension, Strube was assigned to a remote area to guard sex offend-
ers, who routinely taunted her. The inmates were not disciplined,
although it was typical to do so. Strube then filed a lawsuit claiming that
the slapping incident was merely a pretext to punish her for her report to
the Texas Department of Health. Approximately five months later, the
other jailer in the slapping incident got his probation reduced, but
Strube's request for a similar reduction was denied. Thereafter, Strube
was investigated for a number of minor violations and was terminated.
The appellate court held that the facts presented were sufficient to sup-
port the jury's finding of retaliatory conduct on the part of the employer
would not have occurred but for Strube's report to the Department of
Health.557
In Brady v. Houston Independent School District,558 Shirley Brady was
employed by the Houston Independent School District (HISD) as a sys-
tems programmer. During an investigation of the department, Ms. Brady
disclosed that Ernie Carney, an outside computer consultant, had loaned
money to the assistant superintendent in charge of the data processing
department and that in exchange for forgiveness of the loan, Carney was
given a higher hourly wage and was paid for hours not actually worked.
Several years later, and after a computer breakdown, HISD divested
Brady of her duties as systems programmer and outsourced the duties to
a computer consulting firm that employed Carney. Among other claims,
Brady sued HISD for violation of the Texas Whistle Blower Act. The
trial court granted summary judgment on the claim, and Brady appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment,
stating only that Brady's "contentions are wholly without merit. '559
In Permian Basin Community Centers for Mental Health and Mental
Retardation v. Johns,560 Bob Johns filed suit against Permian Basin Com-
munity Centers for Mental Health and Mental Retardation (PBCC) al-
leging that he had lost his job as a community living instructor in violation
of the Texas Whistle Blower Act for reporting an incident of abuse.
PBCC denied any retaliation and claimed that Johns was not an em-
ployee of PBCC and that he had failed to exhaust his administrative rem-
557. See id. at 850.
558. 113 F.3d 1419 (5th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 121 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 1997).
559. Id. at 1425.
560. 951 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no pet. h.).
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edies. After a jury verdict in favor of Johns, PBCC appealed. The court
of appeals noted that a few months after Johns began working for PBCC,
PBCC entered into a contract with Dean Williams for the management of
several of its group homes, and all employees at these homes were trans-
ferred over to Williams' payroll. 561 PBCC first contended that in the ab-
sence of a written agreement there could be no employment relationship.
The court held that the lack of an express employment contract was not
fatal to Johns' Whistle Blower Act claims, noting that an at-will employ-
ment arrangement was contractual and had been held to be included
within the definition of public employees. 562 PBCC next argued that
Johns was an employee of the Williams Independent Management Com-
pany operating the group homes for PBCC. The court held that the fact
that the Williams/PBCC contract stated an independent contract relation-
ship, was not dispositive of the relationship between PBCC and Johns.563
Central to the question of whether Johns was an employee of PBCC was
the control over the details of the work performed, including decisions
over staffing and personnel.5 64 Although Johns was paid through Wil-
liams' company, PBCC "retained the right to evaluation [sic] perform-
ance, hire and fire, set hours and salaries, define work assignments, and
supervise the day-to-day functioning of the group home. '565 Conse-
quently, the court of appeals found that Johns was an employee of
PBCC.56
6
PBCC fared better on its argument that Johns had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. First of all, the court concluded that failure to
exhaust administrative remedies under the Whistle Blower Act was a ju-
risdictional prerequisite to filing suit and not an affirmative defensei 67
Consequently, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and the
court of appeals reversed the jury verdict in favor of Johns and remanded
the case to the trial court with orders to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.568
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS, ARBITRATION
AND PREEMPTION
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is
unenforceable because it violates public policy. 569 The Texas Constitu-
561. See id. at 499.
562. See id. at 500.
563. See id.
564. See id. at 501.
565. Id.
566. See id.
567. See id. at 502.
568. See id.
569. See Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991); Ju-
liette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. 1990); Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 SW.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991); Weatherford Oil
Tool Co. v. A. G. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 312, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT
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tion declares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivi-
sion are not permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free
government. '570 In 1889, the Texas Legislature enacted its first antitrust
law and it remained almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas Free
Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983.571 Generally, this legislation pro-
hibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain
trade or commerce.5 72 Historically, Texas courts have closely scrutinized
private sector contracts which restrain trade.573 However, the Covenant
Not to Compete Act 574 protects noncompetition agreements if they meet
certain statutory criteria. 575
The courts continue to closely and critically examine covenants not to
compete for compliance with statutory requirements and to prevent an
unreasonable intrusion on free enterprise. 576
In Ireland v. Franklin,577 Monna Rae Ireland sued her former em-
ployer for breach of contract and her former employer counterclaimed
for breach of a covenant not to compete. The covenant not to compete
provided that the covenant would last for eighteen months following ter-
mination, that Ireland would not engage in any sort of chiropractic serv-
ices within twenty miles of any Franklin clinic, that Ireland would not
contact any patients after termination, and that Ireland would not hire
any Franklin employee. Ireland also promised not to disclose any of
(SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 186 (1981); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 660
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ). For a thorough analysis of the enforceability of non-
competition agreements, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor
Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1789-95 (1992).
570. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26.
571. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.51 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1993).
572. The Texas Supreme Court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agree-
ment is a restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate
the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
573. See Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. 1991);
Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893); Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press &
Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880); Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 602
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ). See 1991 Annual Survey, supra note 6, at 378-83
(analyzing factors).
574. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
575. The Covenant Not to Compete Act provides:
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope
of activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to
cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a re-
straint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed ...
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.r. § 15.51(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
576. See Centel Cellular Co. v. Light, 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994); CRC-Evans Pipeline
Int'l, Inc. v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (cove-
nant rejected); Deaton v. United Mobile Networks L.P., 926 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1996, no writ) (covenant enforced as modified).
577. 950 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
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Franklin's trade secrets. Ireland opened a clinic within three miles of a
Franklin clinic and sent out grand opening announcements to Franklin
patients. The trial court granted Franklin's motion for temporary injunc-
tion against Ireland for violating the covenant not to compete and the
appellate court affirmed. 578 The court held that a covenant not to com-
pete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement at the time the agreement is made but an at-will employment
contract cannot be the "otherwise enforceable agreement. ' 579 While Ire-
land's employment was at-will, the covenant not to compete also con-
tained a trade secret clause wherein Franklin promised to share trade
secrets with Ireland. The covenant not to compete was ancillary to the
trade secrets clause because: (1) Franklin's consideration (Franklin's
promise) gave rise to Franklin's interest in restraining Ireland from com-
peting; and (2) the covenant was designed to enforce Ireland's considera-
tion not to use or disclose trade secrets.580
In Donahue v. Bowles, Troy, Donahue, Johnson, Inc.,581 James Dona-
hue appealed from a summary judgment awarded Bowles, Troy, Dona-
hue, Johnson, Inc. (Bowles) declaring that a covenant not to compete was
enforceable. Donahue sold insurance for Bowles and had entered into an
employment agreement that contained a covenant not to compete. After
Donahue left, Bowles eventually sued, seeking a declaration that the cov-
enant not to compete was enforceable. On appeal, the court noted that
section 15.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code required that,
for a covenant not to compete to be valid, there must be an otherwise
enforceable agreement to which the covenant not to compete is ancillary
or a part of at the time the agreement is made.582
As to the first issue, the otherwise enforceable agreement, Bowles ad-
mitted that Donahue was an at-will employee, and, by definition, "an em-
ployee at-will and his employer cannot form an 'otherwise enforceable
agreement' pertaining to the duration of employment. '583 However, en-
forceable agreements could emanate from at-will employment as long as
the consideration for any promise was not illusory. 584 While Bowles tried
to assert that the employment agreement and a September 1983 share-
holders agreement were part of a single transaction, there was no sum-
mary judgment evidence with respect to such a shareholder agreement.
Consequently, the court would consider only the employment agreement,
which contained the illusory promises.585 There were, however, two
promises to support an otherwise enforceable agreement: Donahue's
promise to return Bowles' property upon termination and the promise to
578. See id. at 158.
579. Id.
580. See id.
581. 949 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).
582. See id. at 750.
583. Id.
584. See id. at 751.
585. See id.
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give thirty days notice prior to termination in exchange for Bowles' also
giving thirty days notice.5 86
The court next turned to the second issue, that the contract not to com-
pete must be ancillary to the otherwise enforceable agreement; specifi-
cally, that the "consideration given by the employer in the otherwise
enforceable agreement must give rise to the employer's interest in re-
straining the employee from competing" and "the covenant must be
designed to enforce the employee's consideration or return promise in
the otherwise enforceable agreement. '587 Bowles contended that the re-
strictive covenant was intended to protect the value of the company's
goodwill and customer relationships. Even given this purpose, the court
explained that Bowles' promise to give thirty days notice, the only nonil-
lusory promise made by Bowles, did not give rise to the stated interest in
restraining Donahue from competing.588 Consequently, the covenant not
to compete was not ancillary to the otherwise enforceable employment
agreement and the ruling of the trial court was reversed.589
In American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Scott,590 American Ex-
press sought a preliminary injunction to enforce the terms of a covenant
not to compete entered into with Scott. Scott had entered into a contract
with American Express which stated that he was an independent contrac-
tor and which contained various noncompete provisions. Scott resigned
from American Express, but before he left, he sent out a letter on Ameri-
can Express stationary informing his customers that he was switching to
another brokerage.5 91 For the covenant not to compete to be enforcea-
ble, as determined by Texas Business and Commerce Code section 15.50,
there must be an otherwise enforceable agreement other than the non-
compete agreement.592 Although Scott attempted to argue that the
promises made by American Express in their at-will employment contract
were illusory, the court noted that American Express incurred large ex-
penses in establishing goodwill, which American Express allowed Scott to
use and gave Scott credibility he would not have otherwise enjoyed be-
cause of his novice status in the financial planning field.593 American Ex-
press also provided lengthy and expensive training and a substantial
customer base. Upon termination of the agreement, which could be done
by either party without cause upon fifteen days notice, Scott agreed not
to solicit American Express clients and not to use American Express'
confidential information for one year. Consequently, the court held that
the promises were not illusory and that an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment existed. 594
586. See id.
587. Id. at 751-52.
588. See id. at 752.
589. See id.
590. 955 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
591. See id. at 690.
592. See id. at 691.




The next inquiry in judging the validity of a covenant not to compete
was whether the non-compete was ancillary to the otherwise enforceable
agreement. The court noted that the "training, confidential information
and trade secrets given by Plaintiff to Defendant gave rise to Plaintiff's
interest in restraining Defendant from competing" and that the covenant
not to compete "enforces Defendant's return promise not to use or dis-
close the confidential information and trade secrets in the context of the
otherwise enforceable Contract. '595 Furthermore, the court determined
that the covenant not to compete contained reasonable restrictions as to
time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained and did not
impose a greater restraint than necessary to protect the goodwill and
other business interests of American Express. 596 The non-compete
agreement was one year in duration and limited Scott from contacting
customers that he served while at American Express, but contained no
express geographical limitation. However, the agreement made clear that
Scott could sell his services wherever he chose so long as he did not sell to
clients and potential clients, which were defined by the agreement as per-
sons who have bought American Express' products, people to whom a
sales presentation had been given, or members of their household. Fi-
nally, the court found the restraint to be no broader than necessary to
prevent Scott from misappropriating and using confidential information
and trade secrets. 597
With regard to the remaining standards for a preliminary injunction,
the court held that the injury resulting from a breach of a covenant not to
compete was "the epitome of irreparable injury. '598 Furthermore, as
Scott could sell his services to anyone outside the definition of client or
potential client, the harm to Scott from the restrictions would not out-
weigh the harm to American Express in terms of lost customer goodwill
and business.599 Additionally, granting the preliminary injunction would
serve the public interest because Scott breached his contract and made
deliberate misrepresentations about his affiliation with American Express
and his new venture on American Express letterhead, and preventing
Scott from profiting from these misrepresentations would be in the pub-
lic's interest.600 Finally, the court noted that it had the right to enter pre-
liminary injunctive relief even though either party may later request
arbitration.601
A. BEYOND NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS: TRADE SECRETS
In DSC Communications Corp. v. Next Level Communications,602
595. Id.
596. See id. at 692-93.
597. See id.
598. Id. at 693.
599. See id.
600. See id. at 693-94.
601. See id. at 694.
602. 107 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 120 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Thomas Eames and Peter Keeler were employed by DSC Communica-
tions Corp. (DSC). While an employee of DSC, Mr. Eames began devel-
oping a broadband access product. He identified two alternative designs
for the product. DSC claimed that it instructed Mr. Eames to focus on
one of the alternatives as a short-term solution but to continue to develop
the other technology, known as an SDV system. While still employed by
DSC, Mr. Eames developed a business plan for a new company to de-
velop the SDV system. Mr. Eames and Mr. Keeler soon resigned from
DSC and formed their own company, Next Level Communications (Next
Level), which focused its efforts on developing an SDV system. DSC
sued Next Level, Eames, and Keeler for, among other claims, misappro-
priation of trade secrets and usurpation of corporate opportunity. The
jury found in favor of DSC, and judgment was entered. The Fifth Circuit
vacated the judgment in favor of DSC on the diversion of corporate op-
portunity claim. 603 The court reasoned that under Texas law, the usurpa-
tion of corporate opportunity doctrine is inapplicable to any fiduciary
who is not also an officer, director, or major shareholder of a corporate
entity.60 4 Because none of the defendants was ever an officer, director, or
major shareholder of DSC, the defendants could not be held liable on this
claim.605
DCS did, however, prevail on its district court claim for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets but was denied a permanent injunction and appealed
this issue. In concluding that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion, the court reasoned that the money damages recovered by DSC suffi-
ciently compensated it for the misappropriation of trade secrets, that no
irreparable harm was suffered, and that the drastic solution of a perma-
nent injunction was unnecessary. 60 6
In United Mobile Networks, L.P. v. Deaton,60 7 the Supreme Court of
Texas, in a per curiam decision, dealt with the proper proof needed to
establish a claim for damages for conversion. United Mobile Networks
(UMN) had purchased Ronny Deaton's two-way radio business, paying
$450,000 for his customer list as part of the purchase. Ronny agreed to
continue to manage part of the business and agreed to a five year cove-
nant not to compete as part of his employment agreement. Ronny volun-
tarily left UMN some three years later, taking with him a copy of UMN's
customer list. Ronny went to work for his wife Barbara, who had been
fired by UMN shortly after Ronny left for having a conflict with a UMN
603. See id. at 324.
604. See id. at 326.
605. See id. at 326-27.
606. See id. at 328. By way of note, the original damage award in DSC was
$369,200,000. Because some claims were duplicative, the court required DSC to elect the
claim on which it would recover. The plaintiff chose the usurpation of business opportu-
nity claim and judgment was entered for $125,532,000. Because the court threw out the
usurpation of business opportunity claim, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case so that the
district court could enter judgment in the amount awarded for misappropriation of trade
secrets. That amount is not set forth in the case.
607. 939 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. 1997).
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salesman. UMN sued, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
damages for a host of causes of action, including conversion of the cus-
tomer list. A jury awarded UMN $500,000 on the conversion claim. The
court of appeals affirmed the conversion finding but reversed and re-
manded on the damages issue, finding first that there was "no evidence"
yet concluding that there was "factually insufficient evidence" to support
the damage award. 60 8
Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court reversed.609 The
Court noted that the general measure of conversion damages is the fair
market value of the property at the time and place of the conversion. 610
However, damages for conversion would be limited to those necessary to
compensate the plaintiff for actual losses that naturally and proximately
resulted from the defendant's conversion. 611 To prove its damages, UMN
offered an expert who testified that the customer list had a fair market
value of $554,733.98, basing his testimony on the income generated from
the list. The Court discounted this testimony, stating that the testimony
presumed that UMN had lost all the customers and income from the list
and not just the list itself.612 The Court pointed out that UMN continued
to use the list and generate income from customers on the list.613 Also,
UMN offered no evidence that the taking of the list had caused them to
lose customers or income or would cause them to do so in the future.
UMN's expert even conceded that the list would have no value under his
valuation method if customers on the list were not generating revenue for
whomever held it.614 UMN also attempted to argue that the exclusive
nature of the list and the opportunity to capture the customer's business
gave the list value. However, UMN's expert did not base his testimony
on exclusivity and, as UMN testified that it had already captured and still
retained most of its customers, there was no evidence of any lost opportu-
nity to capture business.615 UMN having offered no competent evidence
from which to establish a claim for damages for conversion of the cus-
tomer list, resulted in the Court reversing the lower court's decision and
rendering a take nothing judgment against UMN.616
B. ARBITRATION
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Curry,617 Ronald Giacoma sued his em-
ployer Circuit City claiming that he had been discharged in retaliation for
filing a workers' compensation claim. In March 1995, Circuit City gave
all associates and managers an Associate Issue Resolution Package
608. Id. at 146-47.
609. See id. at 147.
610. See id. at 148.
611. See id. at 147-48.





617. 946 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, n.w.h.).
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(AIRP), which included an arbitration provision for most employer-em-
ployee disputes. An "opt-out" form was included that the employee had
to sign in order to avoid participating in arbitration. Giacoma signed the
acknowledgment that he received the AIRP, but he did not sign the opt-
out form. The AIRP provided that it was to be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act and that the arbitrator could award monetary damages.
In May 1995, Circuit City fired Giacoma. Approximately one year later,
he submitted an arbitration request form to Circuit City, alleging that he
had been terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim. The re-
quest form specifically provided that by submitting a request, the em-
ployee was agreeing to final and binding arbitration of the dispute.
Giacoma also participated in selecting an arbitrator and in a preliminary
hearing. Shortly thereafter Giacoma filed suit and informed the arbitra-
tor that he would not participate in the arbitration. Circuit City filed a
motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion and Cir-
cuit City filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The appellate court con-
ditionally granted the writ and ordered the case to arbitration.618 The
court noted that there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration that
must be applied when construing arbitration agreements. 619 The court
rejected Giacoma's claim that his acknowledgment of the receipt of the
AIRP, his failure to return the opt-out form, his continuing to work after
he got the AIRP, and his participation in selecting an arbitrator do not
create an agreement. 620 The court found that by continuing to work after
getting the AIRP and deciding not to opt out, he accepted the arbitration
agreement as a matter of law. 621 Furthermore, Giacoma's receipt of the
AIRP package and failure to return the opt-out form created a legal pre-
sumption that he understood its contents, and his participation in select-
ing an arbitrator and in a preliminary hearing demonstrated that there
was an agreement to arbitrate. 622 Finally, the court found that because
Giacoma had the opportunity to opt out, the agreement was not
unconscionable. 623
In Solis v. Evins,624 Yolanda Solis sued her former employer for defa-
mation. Solis was a bank teller for IBC bank. IBC required its employ-
ees to have an account with them for the purpose of direct deposit of
paychecks. All account holders were required to sign a "depositor's con-
tract," which included an arbitration provision.625 No contract was pro-
duced with Solis' signature, but an exemplar one was produced. Solis was
involved with several transactions that IBC viewed suspiciously. She was
reported to federal authorities and was eventually prosecuted, though ac-
618. See id. at 490.
619. See id. at 488.




624. 951 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
625. See id. at 47.
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quitted. She sued IBC and IBC's president, David Guerra. The court
stayed the case and ordered the parties to arbitration based on the depos-
itor's contract. Prior to arbitration, the case settled. Solis believed that
Guerra continued to defame her in social contexts. She filed another def-
amation lawsuit, naming only Guerra as the defendant. The trial court
again ordered the parties to arbitration and Solis sought a writ of manda-
mus. The appellate court granted the writ and ordered the trial court to
vacate its order of arbitration. The court raised serious doubts that
Guerra, individually, had standing to assert the terms of the depositor's
contract due to his lack of privity to the contract. 626 The court in the
interest of justice, however, decided to entertain Guerra's argument that
the contract required arbitration.627 The court recognized that there is a
strong presumption in favor of arbitration that the arbitration agreement
related to Solis' status as a depositor and thus to controversies arising out
of the depositor's contract. 628 The agreement did not, however, reach
disputes such as those alleged by Solis claims of defamation against
Guerra.629
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Akpan,630 Ubong Akpan sued Bur-
lington Northern Railroad Company (Burlington) alleging that his termi-
nation was the result of race and national origin discrimination, in
violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. The trial court
denied Burlington's motion to compel arbitration and to stay the suit
pending completion of binding arbitration, and Burlington filed an inter-
locutory appeal. The evidence showed that Burlington had adopted a
policy that required binding arbitration of all disputes relating to the ter-
mination of employment, and Akpan continued to work after receiving a
copy of the policy.631 Although Akpan asserted that he did not receive
unequivocal notice of the implementation of the policy, Akpan admitted
that he received a copy of the policy, and the language of the policy was
clear and unequivocal.632 Moreover, the arbitration agreement was in
writing, and there was no requirement that the agreement be signed. 633
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed and remanded to the trial
court, with instructions to grant Burlington's motion, reasoning that Bur-
lington established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the dispute
as a matter of law.634
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. McFall,635 Greg Nix sued his former
employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), alleging, among other
things, that UPS terminated him in retaliation for filing a workers' com-
626. See id. at 47 n.1.
627. See id.
628. See id. at 48.
629. See id. at 51.
630. 943 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
631. See id. at 49.
632. See id. at 51.
633. See id. at 52.
634. See id.
635. 940 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, n.w.h.).
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pensation claim. UPS asserted that the retaliatory discharge claim should
be dismissed because the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) be-
tween UPS and the union representing its employees required that un-
resolved grievances be submitted to binding arbitration. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, and UPS petitioned for mandamus.
The appellate court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus and
directed the trial court to order the parties to submit the retaliatory dis-
charge claim to arbitration.636 In so doing, the court explained that the
arbitration provision required arbitration of any unresolved "grievance,"
which was defined as "any controversy, complaint, misunderstanding, or
dispute arising as to interpretation, application or observance of any of
the provisions of this [collective bargaining] Agreement. ' '637 Because the
CBA specifically prohibited UPS from engaging in any discriminatory
acts prohibited by law, Nix's retaliatory discharge claim involved a dis-
pute as to the observance of a provision of the CBA.638 The court also
held that UPS did not waive its right to request arbitration by its failure
to request arbitration until approximately three years after suit was filed,




Employers should compare the generally less favorable treatment of
preemption arguments, as opposed to the generally more favorable treat-
ment of arbitration arguments, when an employee asserts discriminatory
discharge or similar retaliation.
In Fuller v. Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp.,640 Terry Fuller
brought suit against Temple-Inland Forest Products Corporation (Tem-
ple) alleging that Temple had retaliated against him for filing a workers'
compensation claim in violation of section 451.001 of the Texas Labor
Code. Temple removed the case to federal court on the grounds that the
adjudication of Fuller's claims required an interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement between Fuller's union and Temple and, as such,
the case was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA). 641 In analyzing Fuller's motion to remand, the court
noted that LMRA preemption could occur even though 28 U.S.C.
§ 1445(c) states that a "civil action in any State court arising under the
workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any
district court of the United States. '642 If a plaintiff's state law claim is
inextricably intertwined with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
section 301 of the LMRA preempts the state law claim and there is a
636. See id. at 720.
637. Id. at 719.
638. See id. at 719-20.
639. See id. at 720.
640. 942 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Tex. 1996).




basis for removal. 643 In Fuller's case, the central issue was whether or not
he was discriminated against or discharged in retaliation for filing a claim
for workers' compensation benefits. The court held that this issue was
not inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement in
this case, as reference to the CBA was not necessary to determine if retal-
iation was one of the reasons for Temple's actions with respect to
Fuller.644 Furthermore, the court distinguished case law cited by Temple
and found that, even assuming that Fuller's deposition testimony indi-
cated that he was relying on the CBA to support his retaliatory discharge
claim, Fuller had a separate claim of discrimination in job assignments
that was independent of the CBA.645 Accordingly, the court held that
section 301 of the LMRA did not preempt Fuller's retaliatory discharge
claim under section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code.646
Preemption of a workers' compensation discrimination claim by DOT
federal transportation laws was also unsuccessful in Graef v. Chemical
Leaman Corp.6 4 7 James Graef sued his former employer for retaliatory
discharge in violation of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Graef
was a truck driver and injured his shoulder and forearm on December 21,
1990. He received workers' compensation benefits through April 1994,
when he settled his claim for a lump sum. He remained out of work for
nearly three years. While out, his DOT medical certificate expired. He
failed his physical, and was removed from the seniority rolls, in accord-
ance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement which pro-
vided that absence from the job for more than three years due to injury
or illness results in the loss of seniority. Graef claimed that his employer
engaged in delaying tactics to allow the three year anniversary of his ab-
sence to pass and that the employer's physician had predetermined that
Graef could not pass the DOT physical. Graef prevailed at trial. The
appellate court held that Graef's cause of action was not preempted by
federal transportation law.648 The court noted that there are two ways in
which preemption may occur: (1) where compliance with both the state
law and the federal law is a physical impossibility; and (2) where the ap-
plication of state law would frustrate the purpose of a federal statutory
scheme.649 The court found that liability could be imposed pursuant to
the workers compensation act without interfering with DOT regula-
tions.650 Graef's case would not result in the employer having to put dis-
abled drivers behind the wheel; it would only result in preventing the
employer from discharging a worker because the worker filed a workers
compensation claim.651
643. See id.
644. See id. at 311.
645. See id. at 311-12.
646. See id.
647. 106 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1997).
648. See id. at 116.
649. See id. at 115-16.
650. See id. at 116.
651. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If summarization of the employment cases discussed in this Annual
Survey is even possible, the single point to be made is the importance of
an employer's pro-active approach to employee relations. Solid person-
nel practices, reasoned and reviewed management decisions, and consis-
tent application of company policies create "good facts" upon which
"good law" derives. The reverse, however, "bad facts" resulting in "bad
law" is equally true and far more costly.
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